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Appraising the Progressive State
Herbert Hovenkamp*
ABSTRACT: Since its origins in the late 19 th century, the most salient
characteristics of the progressive state have been marginalism in economics,
the greatly increased use of scientific theory and data in policy making, and
the encouragement of broad electoral participation. All have served to make
progressive policy less stable than classical and other more laissez-faire
alternatives. However, the progressive state has also performed better than
alternatives by every economic measure. One of the progressive state's biggest
vulnerabilities is commonly said to be its susceptibility to special interest
capture. The progressive state makes many decisions via either legislation or
administrative agencies, and both are thought to be prone to special interest
control at the expense of the public. Nevertheless, the superior economic
performance of the progressive state calls that conclusion into question. How
can a state policy that is so prone to special interest capture also produce
superior results?
One severe weakness of the capture argument against the progressive state is
that it uses the free market as a baseline for identifying what is in the public
interest. Under such a standard, any political theory that believes that market
failure is more widespread and in need of correction will generate too many
false positives suggesting capture. In fact, special interest capture often
explains failures to regulate as much as special interest regulation itself and
today the former dominates the latter on many important issues. Ironically,
one exacerbating factor in producing such capture is the structural features
of the Constitution itself which place much higher burdens on those seeking
to regulate than on those seeking to resist regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal and political institutions that comprise the modern progressive
state had many of their origins in the historical United States Constitution,
but progressivism's most distinctive modern features began to emerge in the
late i 9th century. The structures we identify with the modern progressive state
were largely in place by the beginning of World War II and continued on an
expansion course through the years of the Warren Supreme Court
(1953-1969) and LBJ administration (1963-1969). Since that time the
progressive state has been heavily criticized by conservatives and libertarians2
but defended by many liberals and moderates.3
The most important attributes of the modern progressive state are a
belief that legal policy should be guided by the best available scientific
knowledge; marginalism in economics; anti-historicism in the social sciences;
a strong commitment to non-market institutions, heavily reflected in policy
making carried out by government agencies; deferential judicial review of
1. On the historical development of the progressive state, see generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970
(2015). On politics and social movements, see generally JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE
TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920 (3 d ed. 2000); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); and MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003). See generally
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT,
AND THE GOLDEN AGE OFJOURNALISM (2013).
2. Recent examples include THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS
& AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016); 1-2 ELLIS WASHINGTON, THE
PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION: LIBERAL FASCISM THROUGH THE AGES (2013).
3. See generally, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNEIA- How THE WAR
ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2016); IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR
ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING
THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1993).
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economic legislation that does not clearly violate express provisions of the
Constitution, but harsher review of provisions that adversely affect
underrepresented minorities or impair the practice of fundamental rights.
One other progressive value is equally important, although its meaning
has shifted over the years. That is progressives' strong commitment to broad
political participation by voting, including flirtations with direct democracy.4
Broad voter participation was central to the early Progressive Era,5 but it
produced tension with later progressives' increased reliance on science and
expertise to make policy.6 The latter impulse triumphed during the New Deal,
giving way to ideas about statecraft favoring expertise, administrative law, and
judicial deference-and in the process insulating government decision-
making from direct citizen control.7 As legal realistJames Landis put it, in a
complex world where policy is driven by scientific conception, it is essential
that issues be decided "by those best equipped for the task."' Despite this
tension, the concern with citizen participation has had consistent support in
the progressive state. One example is the Civil Rights Era's concern with
redistricting and equal voting, strongly expressed by the Voting Rights Act.9
Another is the more recent concerns about campaign finance reform, voter
ID laws or polling place closure that threaten to limit voter participation. o
Another progressive value is government stimulation of labor
participation and welfare. Progressive support for labor in large part reflects
progressivism's "demand-side" approach to the economy. That has entailed
broad support for both labor unions and minimum wage laws, as well as a
government commitment o full employment, even if it produces some
4. See generally IN DEFENSE OF THE FOUNDERS REPUBLIC: CRITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lonce H. Bailey &Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2015).
5. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 257-6o; MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE
73-124 (2016). Contemporary sources include BENJAMIN PARKE DEWITT, THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 4 - 5 (1915)-
6. One good example is articulated by New Deal legal scholar and administrative law
expertJames M. Landis. SeeJAMEs M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 22-25 (1938).
7. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS GOVERNMENT 130-50 (1930) (describing the
superiority of expert managers over lay voters as policymakers). For sharp qualifications, see
generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1954).
8. James M. Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 4 7 YALE L.J. 519, 536 (1938).
9. WALDMAN, FIGHT TO VOTE, supra note 5, at 125-70.
10. Id. at 2 13-65. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One
Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 21 (2014); Tiffany R. Jones,
Campaign Finance Reform: The Progressive Reconstruction of Free Speech 321, in THE PROGRESSIVE
REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN REGIME (John
Marini & Ken Masugi, eds., 2005); see also generally Veasey v. Abbott, 83o F. 3 d 216 (5 th Cir. 2016)
(striking down a Texas voter ID provision).
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inflation." This commitment may explain why economic growth has been
significantly more robust under more progressive administrations.,2
This article is not a defense of the progressive state. Rather, it attempts
to understand the progressive legal mindset, to appreciate its strengths and
weaknesses, to assess its comparative advantages and disadvantages against
alternatives, and to suggest areas of improvement.
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROGRESSIVE STATE
The modern progressive state owes many of its origins to the political
movement called progressivism, or the Progressive Era. Dating its beginning
is difficult. In hindsight, state regulation of hours and conditions of labor
from the late i9 th and early 2oth century's certainly signaled the origins of
progressivism, as did such federal statutes as the Sherman Act (i89 o)'s and
the Pure Food and Drug Act (i9o6).'5 In 1908, Edwin R.A. Seligman wrote a
book entitled Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice,'6 but he was really
referring to taxation schemes that taxed wealthier people at higher rates,
which was only a small part of the Progressive agenda. Herbert Croly, founder
of The New Republic, published his very influential The Promise of American Life
the next year.'7 Croly advocated a more corporatist state that did a greater
amount of economic planning.8 During the 1912 presidential campaign, all
three major candidates (incumbent Howard Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and
Woodrow Wilson) claimed the label "progressive" to one extent or another.
But it really fell to mid-century historians looking back to define and label the
Progressive movement. Most notably, Richard Hofstadter did so in The Age of
Reform, followed by others.'9 Today we generally think of the Progressive Era
as running from sometime in the very late igth century until 1920.20 The
latter date is somewhat firmer, at least at the federal level, identified by the
election of President Warren G. Harding.
The modern progressive state developed during a period of rapid
scientific and demographic change. First, beginning in the late 1 9th century,
11. See ROBERT POLLIN, BACK TO FULL EMPLOYMENT 128-40 (2012).
12. See discussion infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding a maximum-hour
provision for women); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (striking down a
maximum-hour provision); In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112-15 (N.Y. 1885) (striking down a statute
prohibiting cigar rolling in tenement houses).
14. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (189o) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)).
15. Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
16. See generally EDWIN RA SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIvE TAXATION IN THEORYAND PRACTICE (sgo8).
On Seligman's influence on American tax policy, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 92-100.
17. See generally HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1gog).
18. Id. at 141-214, 315-98.
19. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 1; see also generally HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE
DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE, 1897-1917 (1951).
20. See HOFSTADTER, supranote s, at 132-48.
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progressive economics and science entered the American academy.21 The
principal developments were economic marginalism, which led to expanding
ideas about market failure and the need for regulation; recognition that
inequality of wealth is an appropriate concern of legal policy; and
acknowledgement hat risk management often requires the aggregation of
populations for purposes such as social security, insurance, and even contract
and tort law." Another important characteristic of the first generation of
American progressives was the greatly increased use of science, particularly
social science, in policymaking.23 While the first generation of progressives
enthusiastically turned to the social sciences, the social science of the day was
heavily Darwinian, and genetic determinism was the ruling model.24 More
environmentalist models for the social sciences came a little later and soon
overran progressive social science methodology.25 Early on, many American
progressives were also strongly Christian, but with a "social" interpretation of
the gospel that was eventually rejected by much of the Christian mainstream.26
A. THE MYTHICAL LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTION
Though the Progressive movement is a convenient point for defining the
scope of the modern progressive state, the ideological roots can be traced
back much farther. In fact, the progressives' experiment with an active state
had ample precedent. It was an integral part of the constitutional and early
national periods, reflected in both the United States and state constitutions
as well as contemporary economic policy.27 While some believe that the
United States Constitution was historically "classical," or antistatist, from its
inception,28 that view is not faithful to the history of either the federal
21. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 1-74.
22. Id.
23. See DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 98-140 (1991). See
generally MARY 0. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTivITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905 (1975)-
24. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 36-74.
25. Seegeneray Herbert Hovenkamp, Racism and Public Law in the Progressive Era (Dec. 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://paper.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2812257.
26. See generally ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, MINISTERS OF REFORM: THE PROGRESSIVES'
ACHIEVEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1889-1920 (illini Books 1984) (1982); SUSAN CURTIS,
A CONSUMING FAITH: THE SOCIAL GOSPEL AND MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE (2001); NELL IRVIN
PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON: A GRASSROOTS HISTORY OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2008).
27. See generally, e.g, FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1989); OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861
(1947); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE's WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
28. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014); Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution
Libertarian?, 2oo8-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9; see also generally RANDY E. BARNETr, OUR
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTYAND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
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constitution or early state constitutions.2 9 Adam Smith's Wealth ofNations, with
its anti-government bent, was published in 1776.30 Nevertheless, his ideas did
not have a significant impact on American views about political economy and
state nonintervention for another two generations. Smith's work was ignored
by the framers of the United States Constitution.3' The federal and state
constitutions of the formative era and early national period contemplated a
government that was active in economic development, although the tools it
used were different from the tools that were developed during and following
the New Deal.32
At the beginning of the 1 9th century the United States was severely
underdeveloped. Government intervention in the economy took the form of
monopoly grants to encourage economic development, as well as tax breaks
and other subsidies dedicated to the creation of infrastructure.33 The early
American state also took a much heavier role in fostering innovation through
the patent system, encouraging the actual development and deployment of
patented devices and processes.34 Under the leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall the Supreme Court facilitated the use of monopoly grants.35 It also
furthered a strongly national and. pro-regulatory interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, designed to facilitate national development and limit state
free riding and other self-interest.3
6
The so-called "classical," or anti-regulatory, Constitution was not the one
contemplated by most of the early framers of federal and state constitutions.
Rather, it developed during the 183os and continued thereafter as part of the
eclectic Jacksonian revolution intended to wrest power from entrenched
economic interests that had profited heavily from earlier more activist public
policy. The election of AndrewJackson in 1828 signaled the development of
constitutional doctrine dedicated to pushing government out of the economy,
including a more restrictive interpretation of the Commerce power,37
29. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWAL. REV. I
(2015); Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1452 (2015) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 28). On the Framers' concern with a strong
economic state, see generally MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS' COUP: THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016).
30. 1-2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., LibertyClassics 1981) (1776).
31. See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 69 (1966); GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981).
32. Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 7-12.
33. Id.atll-12.
34. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ.
L. REV. 263 (2016).
35. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 178o-186o,
160-73 (1977); Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 19-20.
36. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 14-19.
37. See Felix Frankfurter, Taney and the Commerce Clause, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1294
(1936). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
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limitations on the power of the states to create durable monopolies,38 and
limits on state power to use taxes to subsidize business.39 Through a
substantially revised Patent Act in 1836 and the administration of Chief
Justice Roger Brooks Taney, the Jacksonian era turned the American patent
system into one more similar to what we have today, where patents are
regarded as private property rights imposing few social obligations on their
owners.4o The culmination ofJacksonian policy was the rise of substantive due
process, or liberty of contract, doctrine. Chief Justice Taney suggested that
doctrine for federal law already in the 1850s.41 It migrated into the state courts
in the 188os and 1890s42 and the United States Supreme Court around the
turn of the century.43 This Jacksonian constitution is the one that provoked
the progressive reaction, not the constitution of the framers.
While the Jackson era was staunchly laissez-faire in its economic policy, it
cannot be described as libertarian. In fact, at no time in our constitutional
history have we been governed at either the federal or the state level by a
predominantly libertarian view of the State. The original federal Constitution
left the question of religious tests for state offices entirely to the states, but
most state constitutions excluded non-Christians,44 or in some cases even
WAITE (1937).
38. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN IAW, 1836-1937, at 17-41
(1991); Hovenkamp supra note 29, at 19-26.
39. See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1885) (declaring a tax subsidy to an iron
company unconstitutional because it benefitted a private company); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 667 (1874) (declaring that taxation must be for "public purpose").
40. See generally Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag CO., 210 U.S. 405 (19o8) (dominant
firm had no duty to license externally acquired and unused patent to rival); see also generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 34-
41. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852) (concluding that "a
special act of Congress" extending one person's patent retroactively "certainly could not be
regarded as due process of law"); see also infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
42. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 242-45. See generally Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631 (Ill.
1886) (striking down a statute requiring miners doing piecework to be paid by weight rather than
by easily manipulated box); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886) (striking down a statute
requiring iron workers to be paid in money rather than goods); In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (N.Y.
1885) (striking down a statute preventing cigar rolling in tenement houses).
43. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4 5 (1905) (striking down hours regulations
for bakery employees); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down statute
excluding out-of-state insurance companies from the state).
44. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 22 (1776) ("Every person who shall be chosen a member of
either house, or appointed to any office or place of trust ... shall take the following oath, or
affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to wit: 'I, A.B. do profess faith in God
the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for
evermore; and I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament o be given
by divine inspiration. . . ."); MD. CONST. art. 35 (1776) ("That no other test or qualification
ought to be required ... than such oath of support and fidelity to this State ... and a declaration
of a belief in the Christian religion."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. II (1780) ("The governor shall be
chosen annually, and no person shall be eligible to this office, unless ... he shall declare himself
to be of the Christian religion."); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 1 (1780) ("[All persons elected
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Catholics,45 from holding many public offices. Many of them also supported
established churches with tax proceeds.46 Further, no credible case can be
made that the states became more libertarian in matters of religion and
morals during the Jackson era. The previous years had witnessed the
splintering of the evangelical Protestant churches, including loss of
establishment in the northern colonies and states.47 As the Christian Church
lost its authority, the states filled the vacuum. Just as the Jackson period
became a symbol for the extraction of the state from economic management,
it also represented a significant increase in state control of morals,
characterized by the great "reform" movements of that era.48 Among the
Jacksonian moral revolutions was new hostility toward alcohol consumption
and lotteries, now enforced by law, and even expanded efforts to enforce
"victimless" offenses such as blasphemy and various forms of Sabbath
breaking.49 This is hardly the stuff of libertarians.
One important feature of the Substantive Due Process doctrine that
followed theJackson era was a triumvirate of interests that were acknowledged
exceptions to liberty of contract-namely, "health, safety, and morals."
Regulatory intervention was acceptable if the state could show a qualifying
to State office or to the Legislature must] make and subscribe the following declaration, viz: 'I,
A.B., do declare, that I believe the Christian religion, and have firm persuasion of its truth . . . .'");
PA. CONST. § 10 (1776) ("And each member [of the legislature] . . .shall make and subscribe the
following declaration, viz.: 'I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the universe,
the rewarder to the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures
of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration.'").
45. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI (1777) ("The representatives shall be chosen out of the
residents in each county ... and they shall be of the Protestant religion. . . ."); N.J. CONST. art.
XIX (1776) ("[N]o Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any
civil right ... all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect ... shall be capable
of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a member of either branch of the
Legislature . . . ."); N.C. CONsT. art. XXXII (1776) ("That no person who shall deny the being of
God, or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New
Testament ... shall be capable of holding any office, or place of trust or profit in the civil
department within this State.").
46. MD. CONST. art. XXXII (1776) ("[T]he Legislature may, in their discretion, lay a
general and equal tax for the support of the Christian religion . . .. "); N.H. CONST. PL I, art. VI
(1784) ("[T]he legislature ... authorize[s] ... the several towns ... to make adequate
provisions, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers
of piety, religion and morality . . .").
47. See generally 1-2 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833: THE
BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971).
48. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-1846, at
202-68 (1991). See generally ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE
RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (1994); IAN R. TYRRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO
PROHIBITION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, 18oo-1 86o (1979).
49. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 255-62 (noting that Jackson initiated state legislative
campaigns against alcohol, lotteries, and Sabbath breaking). See generally Murphy v. Simpson, 53
Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 419 (1854) (refusing to enforce a contract made on Sunday); Hulet v. Stratton,
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 539 (1850) (same); Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt. 219 (1834) (invalidating the sale of
horses made on Sunday).
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concern with the health, safety, or morals of either the regulated persons or
their customers.so While liberty of contract may have been viewed as based on
fundamental rights or natural law, the health, safety, and morals exceptions
were factual qualifications whose application opened the way to scientific
inquiry. Eventually this trio of justifications became the back door through
which a theory of market failure entered constitutional adjudication.
More than one thousand decisions during the Substantive Due Process
era, including Lochner itself, recited the "safety, health, [and] morals" litany.5'
Speaking of the limits on state power to regulate hours of employment,Justice
Peckham's opinion for the Court clarified that it was the Court's obligation to
determine whether "any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the
morals, the health or the safety of the people," and not something that the
state could simply assert and have taken at face value.s While substantive due
process doctrine was quick to protect property and contract rights, it allowed
exceptions when the rights taken away had to do with such things as lotteries
or consumption of alcohol, even if these interests were lawful when created.ss
As a result, the substantive due process era is much more properly classified
as Christian conservative rather than libertarian.
Under the health, safety, and morals exceptions to liberty of contract, a
state could defend a statute that interfered with the market by showing that it
protected the health or safety of someone other than the contracting parties,
who as adults were presumed to be able to contract for their own health or
safety. If the regulation pertained to morals then it would be upheld even if it
protected only the morals of the person to which the statute applied.54Justice
Peckham emphasized the first point in Lochner, which struck down a statute
limiting the working hours of NewYork bakers to ten per day or 6o per week.ss
He concluded that the health and cleanliness of the workers themselves did
not justify these state-imposed limitations because the bakers were able to
bargain for themselves .5 A protective statute would place the state in "the
50. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 249-51.
51. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at
249-51. On the health, safety, and morals triumvirate as the gateway to a constitutional theory of
market failure see id. at 9, 279-81. On the number of decisions reciting the triumvirate, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Progressive Legal Thought, 72 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 653, 678 (2015) (finding that health,
safety, and morals appeared "in forty-four judicial decisions prior to 18go, an additional oo
decisions between 18go and igoo, and in another 1,100 decisions between 1900 and 1930").
52. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
53. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (denying compensation for the
closing down of a distillery that was lawful when built); Phalen v. Virgina, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163
( 850) (permitting Virginia to renege on a previous grant made to a lottery company); State v.
Murphy, 41 A. 1037 (Vt. 1898) (upholding a statute that closed bars without compensation).
54. On the case law that developed this distinction, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at
243-62.
55. See generally Lochner, i98 U.S.
56. Id. at 62.
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position of a supervisor, or paterfamilias, over every act of the individual."57
Justice Peckham accepted on principle that the law could be sustained if it
affected the "healthful quality of the bread" that the bakers produced, but he
found no evidence of such a link.s5 That link, if proven, would have been a
benefit for people who were not parties to the bakers' employment
agreement.
Three years later, progressive attorney Louis Brandeis successfully
defended a ten-hour law that applied to women by presenting a social-science
brief showing that long hours of labor affected the children of overworked
women laborers.59 Acceptance of this third-party benefit justified the statute,
which the Court upheld." The subheadings of the first "Brandeis Brief'
explicitly named "health," "safety," and "morals" as the relevant concerns of
the challenged statute, presenting evidence that all three required
protection.6 1
In important ways progressive constitutionalism was a return to the
Constitution's more activist economic roots, although with some different
tools for encouraging economic development as well as different
constituencies. The vast rural areas, yeomen farmers, traders and small
businesses that dotted the national landscape at the end of the 18th century
had given way to a country that was far more urban, more dominated by non-
owner laborers, and with a much more uneven distribution of wealth.6r The
urban population of the United States was less than seven percent in the late
18th century, when the Constitution was created.63 By 18go, the census
showed that more than a third of Americans lived in urban areas, and in the
Northeast the percentage was nearly 6o%.64 By 1920 more than half of the
population was urban, as was every individual American region except the
South.65
B. THE SCOPE OF THE PROGRESSIVE AfARGINAL/ST REVOLUTION
Historically, economists had taken their theory of value from the past,
mainly by considering how much labor had gone into making something.
57. Id.
58. Id. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
59. See generally Brief for the State of Oregon, Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No.
107).
6o. Muller, 208 U.S. at 42 2-23.
61. Brief for the State of Oregon, supra note 59, at 28-55; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note
1, at 249-51.
62. SeeJOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY, at xii, xxxiv (2013) (identifying the
Gilded Age, the 1920s, and the present time as the three periods the exhibiting largest
differences in distribution of wealth).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2010: POPULATION AND HOUSING
UNIT COUNTs 20 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 1 o/cph-2-1.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 20-26.
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Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations- "The real price of everything ...
is the toil and trouble of acquiring it."66 This perspective on value was entirely
backward looking. For example, classical political economists believed that
the rate of wages was determined by the size of a "fund" determined by the
surplus that had been saved out of the previous year's production.67 Likewise,
the legal value of a business corporation was based on the amount of capital
that had been paid in, an entirely backward-looking figure.68
In the late igth century, economists in England, Continental Europe,
and the United States began to view economic value in forward-looking, or
marginalist, terms.69 These included William Stanley Jevons and Alfred
Marshall in England, Carl Menger in Austria, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and
John Bates Clark at Columbia University in the United States.7o The extent to
which they were acting independently or were influenced by one another
remains unclear.71
The early marginalists completely upended the classical theory of value
by migrating British marginal utility theory from philosophy, where it had
been developed by Jeremy Bentham,John Austin andJohn Stuart Mill, into a
theory of market exchange.72 Beginning with the premise that value is based
on a person's willingness to buy or sell, the early marginalists worked out the
elementary mathematics of marginalism. People would continue to trade
until "at the margin" they placed the same value on everything in their stock.
At that point they would have no incentive to trade further. They would
produce whenever the expected proceeds from production exceeded the
expected cost. Resources flowed from lower to higher values until they
reached a point of "equilibrium," when they would stop flowing unless
unsettled by some outside force. Early important marginalists, such as
Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall and Yale economist Irving Fisher, were
fascinated by mechanics and conceived of markets as fluids flowing from
higher to lower places until they came to rest in equilibrium.73
These models were to have profound implications, not only for economic
thought but also for the social sciences and policy concerning risk
management. For example, for the marginalists the rate of wages was not
66. 1 SMITH, supra note 30, at 47.
67. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 193.
68. Commonwealth v. Lehigh Ave. Ry. Co., 129 Pa. 405, 418 (188g) (declaring that a
stock's value to a subscriber is "so much and no more than the amount actually paid upon it").
See also the prominent Gilded Age treatise, i WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK 125 (Little, Brown, & Co., 7th ed. 1913) (1887)
(explaining that a share of stock represents "its par value in money or money's worth paid in or
to be paid in to the corporation").
69. SeeHOvENKAMP, supra note 1, at 28.
70. See id. at 28-29.
71. See id. at 28.
72. See id. at 3, 27-28.
73. See id. at 31-33.
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determined by any previously existing fund, but entirely by the laborer's
marginal contribution to the value of the employer's firm. If the employer
anticipated that the laborer would contribute five dollars per day in added
value, he would be willing to pay any amount up to five dollars but not more.74
The value of a corporation no longer depended on the amount of capital that
had been put in when it was formed, but rather on reasonable expectations
about the corporation's business prospects.75
The marginalists were not merely writing new rules about private
markets. Marginalism represented a fundamental shift in human
understanding of value and motive. First, the classical theory of value was not
merely backward-looking, it was also objective in the sense that it saw value as
residing in a particular thing. By contrast, the marginalist theory of value was
both forward-looking but also behavioral, depending on willingness to pay.
Marginalism also enabled the quantification of risk and uncertainty,76 the rise
of the modern insurance industry,77 and deterrence based theories of
criminal punishment.78 Progressivism's attention to risk management led to
the rise of forward looking institutions that manage risk by aggregating
populations, such as Social Security, and health and casualty insurance.79 This
fact suggests why libertarians or others with strong theories about natural
rights tend either to ignore modern economics or have great difficulty
accommodating it.
The impact of marginalism on legal thought is difficult to exaggerate.
Contract law abandoned its insistence on completed, fully-specified
agreements in the past and began to see commercial contracts as devices for
managing ongoing business relationships. Thus, the rise of the good-faith-
purchaser-doctrine and, eventually, legal recognition of long-term business
franchises and other distribution arrangements where price, quantity, and
74. See generally, e.g., JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF
WAGES, INTEREST AND PROFITS (Sentry Press 1965) (1899); J. B. Clark, The Ultimate Standard of
Value, 1 YALE REv. 258 (1892).
75. See 1 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 55-56, 71-73
(1919). See generally Richard H. Hollen & Richard S. Tuthill, Uses of Stock Having No Par Value, 7
A.B.A.J 579 (1921) (advocating use of no-par stock because it switched emphasis away from
paid-in capital and toward earning prospects); Victor Morawetz, Shares Without Nominal or Par
Value, 26 HARV. L. REV. 729 (1913) (similar).
76. See generally, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Sentry Press 1964)
(1921). While a law professor, Supreme Court Justice-to-be William 0. Douglas became a
pioneer in the legal theory of risk management See William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and
Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and
Administration of Risk , 38 YALE L.J. 720 (1929).
77. See generally ALLAN H. WILLETT, THE EcONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE
(Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1951) (1901); H.P. Stellwagen, Automobile Rate Making, ii PROC.
CASUALTYACTUARIAL SOC'Y 27 6 (1925).
78. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 42-52.
79. Seeid.at123-55.
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even the identity of the goods to be sold were not specified.8o The concerns
of tort law moved away from redress for past wrongs and toward risk
management, placing new emphasis on the quantification of negligence,
causation, and eventually on strict liability for dangerous products as a way of
spreading losses.' Already by the time of the Restatement (First) of Torts in
the 1930s, its drafters were developing an early form of cost-benefit analysis
for analyzing harm. The Restatement found actionable negligence when the
risk of conduct "is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as
the utility of the act"8' or a nuisance for a nontrespassory invasion of an
interest in land "unless the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity
of the harm."8 3
Marginalism also enabled economists and lawyers to study the concept of
competition much more finely. They classified markets, firms, and costs in
different ways, and developed the technical conditions for "perfect"
competition.84 In the process they learned that those conditions are in fact
quite strict, and that nearly all markets deviate from them to some degree.
Marginalists came to believe that markets could be improved by state
intervention much more than classical political economists did. The classical
political economists had a very robust theory of markets that acknowledged
failure only infrequently.85 One important exception was John S. Mill's study
of the British postal service, but it came rather late in the history of classical
economics.6 What is often not fully appreciated is how quickly the theory of
market failure developed, from the laissez-faire state to the New Deal
regulatory state in a few decades time.
However, marginalist progressivism was much less stable than the
classical legal theory that preceded it. One destabilizing characteristic was its
8o. See, e.g., Marrinan Med. Supply, Inc. v. Ft. Dodge Serum Co., 47 F.2d 458,466 (8th Cir.
1931) (finding a long-term franchise contract valid in which price and quantity were not
specified); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) ("It is true that [the
plaintiff] does not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the
defendant's indorsements and market her designs. We think, however, that such a promise is
fairly to be implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view to-day. A promise may
be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly
expressed . . . ."); see also K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, H, 48 YALE
L.J. 779 789-90 (1939) (contrasting the backward-looking theory of contract taught in law
schools with distribution contracts in the real business world).
81. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 12 3-55.
82. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 291 (1) (AM. LAwINST. 1934).
83. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS § 826 (AM. LAWINST. 1939).
84. See generally George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1 (1957). For a severe critique, see generally Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol,
Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON. 249 (1934).
85. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 75-90.
86. See id. at 78, 280; 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: WITH SOME
OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 164-68 (1849).
2o01] 1075
IOWA LAWREVEW
penchant for data gathering and science, which inclined progressives to
change policies when prevailing scientific doctrine changed. Another
destabilizing factor was that, although theories of value based on reasonable
expectations give a more satisfactory account of human behavior, they are also
more uncertain and more subject to speculation or manipulation. A good
example is corporate finance theory. Under classical theory the value of a
corporation depended on previously paid-in capital, a figure that could be
determined by a lawyer or judge from account books.87 By contrast, the
neoclassical value of the firm was built on expectations about future
performance-something that involved a great deal more complexity and
prediction, requiring information not only about the firm but also about the
market in which it operated. The rise of government agencies to assess
corporate value reporting paralleled these changes, first under state "blue sky"
laws and later in the federal securities statutes.88
An additional burden that marginalism carried was its mathematical
seriousness, which tended to drive away those not mathematically inclined.
This has particularly been true of social and intellectual historians, who have
generally paid too little attention to the marginalist revolution. Rather, they
have used terms such as "Social Darwinism" to describe the free market, anti-
government views of the right and "Reform Darwinism" to describe the pro-
regulatory interventionist views of the left.89 Justice Holmes himself
contributed to the problem in his Lochner dissent by attributing substantive
due process to Social Darwinist Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.9o
Very little about the liberty of contract doctrine against which Holmes
was reacting had anything to do with Darwin. Darwinians tended to see
human beings as biological organisms and the human mind as only one of its
many organs. The human being lacked free will but was guided by an instinct
for survival that forced it to act in response to its environment. As Holmes
described the behaviorist thought of Darwinian psychologist John B. Watson
in a 1928 letter to Harold Laski, Watson is "so preoccupied with resolving all
our conduct into reflex reactions to stimuli, that he almost denies that
consciousness means anything and that memory is more than a useless and
misleading word."9' Behaviorism, with its radically anti-historicist premises
87. See discussion supra note 68.
88. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i at 159-71; William W. Cook, "Watered Stock"-
Commissions-"Blue Sky Laws"-Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 589-91 (1921).
89. The terms come from Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought. See
generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwINIsM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1944).
go. Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
91. Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (NOV. 23, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLDJ. LASKI, 1916-1935, at
1113, 1113 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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and its opposition to genetic determinism and eugenics, became fundamental
methodology for progressives in the 192os.92
By contrast, marginalist economists pictured the human being as
relentlessly rational, controlled by a mind with an unrestricted set of
preferences. Rationality required that the preferences must be transitive,
which means that if someone preferred A over B and B over C, then she must
also prefer A over C. Unlike the Darwinian view, the environment was not
seen as imposing any constraints on the permissible range of preferences.
Perhaps more precisely, the marginalist economists did not care whether
these constraints existed or what they were. Further, preferences always
looked forward and were based on reasonable expectations about the
future.93
Marginalism also derived a strongly cooperative theory that emphasized
voluntary exchange and the conditions for facilitating it. In contrast,
Darwinism emphasized the individual struggle for existence. To the extent it
existed, cooperation for Darwinians was not based on any rational theory of
exchange but rather on the evolution of survival mechanisms. If group
survival turned out to be superior, as it did among bees, beavers, and other
cooperative organisms, then these relationships developed through a process
of natural selection and not by anything as rational as the organization of
markets. For example, some plants and microbes develop symbiotic
relationships, meaning that hey cannot exist without each other, even though
they do not have a "mind" at all.94
Holmes was one early 2oth century American legal scholar who recast
legal and policy problems in marginalist terms, even though he did not
practice marginalism's mathematics. Unfortunately, too many historians and
biographers have looked almost exclusively to Holmes' occasional statements
about Darwin while failing to appreciate that Holmes' legal theory was
marginalist to its core. While his statements about Darwin are almost always
mere asides, his writings on contract, torts, and criminal law are obsessed with
problems of incentives and risk management. Forward-looking valuation was
much more central to his theory of law than any notion of Darwin.95
So why has the history of progressive thought been skewed so heavily in
favor of Darwinian explanations? Two phenomena seem to account for most
of it. First, as noted above, marginalism in economics very quickly became
mathematical. Already in 18go the great Cambridge economist Alfred
Marshall felt obliged to apologize to his readers for the technical apparatus
contained in his Principles of Economics, at the same time assuring them that
92. See Hovenkamp, supra note 25 (manuscript at 45-46).
93. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 1o6-22.
94. See generally Lynn Margulis, Symbiosis and Evolution, in READINGS IN BIOLOGY AND MAN
140 (1973) (describing, among others, symbiotic relationships among plant roots and soil
bacteria, hermit crabs and sea anemones).
95. On Holmes' underappreciated marginalism, see HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 38-42.
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learning the mathematics would be highly rewarding.96 The marginalism
question divided American economists sharply, with older political
economists such as Simon Newcomb adhering to traditional, backward
looking assessments of value.97 The result was an enormous fight within the
discipline, leading to the formation of the American Economic Association,
initially dominated by progressives but later becoming more conservative.98
By contrast, Darwinian explanations were much easier to interpret. They were
fact driven rather than analytic and did not depend much on mathematics.
They were easy to state verbally. The eugenics movement for selective
breeding to improve the race experienced a similar division. Its heavy use of
mathematics explains why it was embraced so heartily by mathematicians,
statisticians, and economists, but not nearly as much by other social
scientists.99
Second, and of particular importance for those writing the intellectual
history of the progressive movement, Darwinian ideas engaged the public in
ways that marginalism never could. Most significantly was the outrage that
Darwinism produced. Although marginalism's self-oriented hedonism was
inconsistent with evangelical principles, it could not possibly compete with
the idea that mankind descended from the apes. No state appears to have ever
passed a statute forbidding the teaching of marginalism in the schools,,o and
orthodox clergy did not write sermons railing at the evils of marginalist
economics. As a result, the marginalist evolution never captured the attention
of historians and other commentators the way that Darwin did-even though
marginalism had much greater implications for legislative and legal policy.
The result was that intellectual and social historians of the Progressive
Era wrote lengthy discussions of Social Darwinism without ever mentioning
marginalism. They painted long and adoring portraits of economic dissenters
such as Thorstein Veblen, Lloyd George, or Richard T. Ely, but gave short
shrift to economists such as John Bates Clark, Irving Fisher, or Frank Knight,
who were much more influential within their discipline and, eventually, in
policy making.'o'
96. 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNOMICs, at x-xi (18go). Today, Marshall's
mathematics are child's play to even an undergraduate economics major.
97. See generally Simon Newcomb, The Two Schools of Political Economy, 14 PRINCETON REV.
291 (1884).
98. For a contemporary participant's account, see generally Richard T. Ely, The Founding and
Early History of the American Economc Association, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 141 (1936). See also generally A.W.
Coats, The First Two Decades of the American Economic Association, 5o AM. ECON. REV. 55 (1960).
99. See Hovenkamp, supra note 25 (manuscript at 11-18).
100. Cf Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 367 (Tenn. 1927) (upholding a state statute that
forbade the teaching of evolution). On the anti-evolution movement in education, see generally
EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S CONTINUING
DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997).
101. See generally HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1 88o's (1950) (providing a lengthy discussion
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C. THE PROGRESSIVE STATE AND SCIENCE
Progressives were strongly tied to the science of their day and have been
so ever since. Much of the literature on the rise of administrative law has been
focused on the relationship between administrative agencies and the courts,
as well as questions of democratic legitimacy.o But the rise of administrative
agencies was just as prominent for its collection and use of data-something
the courts could not readily do and that legislatures had not done to any
significant extent. Data collection for the purpose of guiding state policy was
a prominent feature of early federal agencies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission (1887), the Bureau of Corporations (1903), the Food and Drug
Administration (1906), and the Federal Trade Commission (1914).")3 Early
on, for most of these agencies their power to collect information was far more
significant than their power actually to make and enforce rules. Some earlier
progressive legal leaders, such as Roscoe Pound, were enthusiastic proponents
of agency data collection.o4 Nevertheless, Pound was also skeptical of agency
adjudicative powers, preferring to see them limited more to the collection and
dissemination of data. In his conception, agencies would collect the data and
legislatures would respond by changing the law. In fact, this difference in
attitude toward the scope of agency power accounted for a substantial part of
the rift between Pound and the legal realists.os The legal realists themselves
were largely enthusiastic supporters of administrative agency adjudication as
well as data collection and interpretation. New Deal government came to
represent their views.,o6
of Veblen; no mention of Knight; and a single mention of Clark, incorrectly labeled a "classical
political economist"); HOFSTADTER, supra note 1 (mentioning progressive economists Veblen,
Ely, and Commons many times, but never Clark, Fisher, or Knight); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949) (making frequent references to
Veblen, but none to Clark, Fisher, or Knight).
102. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); MARK R.
LEVIN, PLUNDER AND DECEIT: BIG GOVERNMENT'S EXPLOITATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE
FUTURE (2015). For much more balanced historical treatments, see DANIEL R. ERNST,
TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940
(2014); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (2012).
103. Among the hundreds of examples are U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE
& LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1907);
U.S. BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
CORPORATIONS ON THE TRANSPORTATION OF PETROLEUM (1906); U.S. BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., INFLUENCE OF FOOD PRESERVATIVES AND ARTIFICIAL COLORS ON DIGESTION AND
HEALTH (1904) (The Department of Agriculture Bureau of Chemistry was later merged into the
Food and Drug Administration.). For a roughly contemporary account, see generally Franklin D.
Jones, HistoricalDevelopment ofthe Law ofBusiness Competition, 3 5 YALE L.J. 905 (1926).
104. E.g., Roscoe Pound, Criminal justice in the American City-A Summary, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 557,559-652 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
105. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 1 17-19.
1o6. Id. at 263-98.
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Dependence on science made the progressive state less stable than the
classical statecraft that preceded it. For example, from today's perspective
much of the data collection from the New Deal era seems anachronistic in
that it was tied to scientific models now regarded as obsolete. A good example
is the 37 volumes of economic studies and thousands of pages of hearings
produced by the New Deal Temporary National Economic Committee
("TNEC"), condemning such things as vertical integration based on
assumptions that are no longer accepted by most economists.07 The longest
report, on the ownership of large American business corporations, ran to
more than 1,500 pages filled with charts and statistics.los A related example is
changes in regulatory doctrine between the 1930s and the 198os, from broad
conceptions of market failure and the need for regulation called for in the
TNEC reports and given effect by the New Deal Congress, to strongly
neoclassical arguments for deregulation, largely reflected in government
economic reports and legislation from the 198os and 199os.-o9
Another powerful, early example is the progressive response to changes
in social science doctrine. The prevailing social science of early progressivism
was genetic racism. Progressives, including Woodrow Wilson, Edward A. Ross,
Irving Fisher, John R. Commons, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Carrie Chapman
Catt, and many others, could be very forward-looking on questions of
economics but white supremacists and racists on questions concerning
interracial social relations, crime, education, and immigration.lo
State-managed eugenics and racism gave us such institutions as the
sterilization of "defectives," even if they had not been convicted of a crime,
although the evidence does not suggest hat these programs were uniquely or
even substantially a Progressive initiative."' They also led to the United States'
107. See generally Robert A. Brady, Reports and Conclusions of the Temporary National Economic
Committee (U.S.A.), 53 ECON.J. 409 (1943). Most of the Reports are available electronically at the
University of Pennsylvania's electronic resources website, http://onlinebooks.1ibraiy.upenn.edu/
webbin/book/lookupname?key=United%2oStates.%2oTemporary%2oNational%2oEconomic%20
Committee.
io8. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200
LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS (1940).
log. See generally, e.g., FTC, DEREGULATION IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1988); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUCKING REGULATION: PRICE COMPETITION AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE
TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: CHANGES IN
AIRFARES, SERVICE, AND SAFETY AT SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND LARGE COMMUNITIES (1996).
110. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 36-74; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Racism, NEW
RAMBLER REV. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/history/progressive-
racism.
ill. See generally, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Contra THOMAS C. LEONARD,
ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
109-28 (2016) (arguing that eugenics and racism drove Progressive conomic reforms); see also
generally GREGORY MICHAEL DORR, SEGREGATION'S SCIENCE: EUGENICS AND SOCIETY IN VIRGINIA
(2008); PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND BUCK v. BELL (2oo8); Hovenkamp, supra note 25.
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experiment with racial zoning, which came to an official end in 1917 in the
Supreme Court's decision in Buchanan v. Warley.H12 The record in that case
is notable for the "Brandeis Brief" submitted by the city of Louisville in
defense of the segregation ordinance, dominated by the work of genetic
racists., '3 Although the Court brought racially exclusionary zoning to an end,
the reason had nothing to do with racial equality but rather with liberty of
contract. The zoning law in question made it unlawful for a white person to
sell his house to anyone he pleased."4 In any event, as a matter of private
ordering, enforced racial exclusivity lasted another three decades in the form
of racially restrictive covenants, initially tolerated by the Supreme Court,"s
but finally declared unenforceable in 1948.116
The period from the igios through the 1930s witnessed a gradual but
dramatic change in the social sciences, away from nature-based and toward
nurture-based theories of human development."7 In psychology it included
behaviorism, a radically anti-genetic theory of human behavior and
response."8 Starting from anthropology it also included cultural relativism,
pioneered by Franz Boas, whose writing stretched from the 1910s into the
1940s. His followers included Melville Herskovits, whose influential work on
"Afro-Americans" in the 192os and after led to the emergence of modem
racial science emphasizing nurture rather than nature; Herskovits'
contemporary, Ruth Benedict; and many others. Cultural relativism quickly
migrated into other social sciences, and even into religion and ethics. Its
message was strongly environmentalist.' 1sAn important scientific amicus brief
submitted in behalf of the petitioners in Shelley v. Kraemer relied exclusively
on social sciences sources reflecting the new environmentalism and
describing race as nothing more than an artificial construct.12 0
112. See generally Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917).
113. Supplemental and Reply Brief for Defendant in Error on Rehearing 142-254,
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and
Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624 (1985). The term "Brandeis Brief' comes from the
work ofJustice Louis Brandeis during the Lochner Era. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
114. On Buchanan and its aftermath, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 66-69.
115. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1926) (holding that the court lacked
jurisdiction because purely private enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant raised no federal
question).
116. Seegenerally Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
117. See Hovenkamp, supra note 25 (manuscript at 41-51); see also generally HAMILTON
CRAVENS, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION: AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE HEREDiHY-ENVIRONMENT
CONTROVERSY, 1900-1941 (1978).
118. Hovenkamp, supra note 25 (manuscript at 46-51).
1ig. See id. (manuscript at 43-46); see also MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL
THEORY 242, 250-89, 398-411 (1968) (discussing the work of Franz Boas, Ruth Benedicts, and
Melville Herscovits).
120. See Application for Leave to File Brief Amicus and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of
Congress of Industrial Organizations and Certain Affiliated, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (Nos. 72, 87, 290, 291), 1947 WL 30436, at *20-22 & nn. 2-5; see alsoHovenkamp, supra
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The instability of the progressives is sometimes confused with lack of
commitment, but that is a fundamental misunderstanding of the progressives'
more empirical and scientific mindset. They tended to follow theories in need
of periodic revision and largely do so to this day.
D. PROGRESSIVE LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
In the early ig80s, Guido Calabresi lamented that the United States had
changed from a legal environment dominated by common law rules to one
that was "choking on statutes."l21 Politically, the regulatory state was largely
the consequence of urbanization and imbalance in economic performance,
including widespread belief that even when the economy performed well it
did not serve everyone. Economist and journalist Henry George opened the
progressive period with his Progress and Poverty, which examined why the
country could be amassing so much wealth but yet produce so much
poverty.12 2
As noted earlier, the rise of marginalist economics led to severely
broadened conceptions of market failure. In studying the economy in the
early 2oth century, marginalists rather quickly came to focus on the numerous
deviations from perfect competition, which had been a more-or-less universal
assumption of classical political economy. They became obsessed with the
technical problem of fixed costs, a characteristic of modern heavy industry
that appeared to make perfect competition impossible.,2s The problem is that
competition drives prices to marginal cost. Such a firm would not be able to
pay off its fixed-cost investments in land, plants, and equipment, and instead
would be driven into bankruptcy. Prior to the 193os, economists were unable
to solve this problem of "ruinous competition," and it became a major issue
during the early years of railroad regulation and antitrust law in the United
States.124 Early progressive writers such as Henry Carter Adams believed that
only price regulation would work in industries with high fixed costs.125 The
problem largely subsided in the 1930s, with economic models that took
product differentiation into account, but these models posed their own
problems for competition.126 Under them, firms could have significant
note 25 (manuscript at 49-51).
121. GUIDO CAIABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
122. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1879).
123. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 308-22.
124. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1040 (1988); see also ELIOTJONEs, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 197-200 (1921). See generally, e.g., Spurgeon Bell, Fixed Costs and Market Price, 32 Q.J.
ECON. 507 (1918); Frank H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price Over Long and Short Periods, 29J.
POL. EcON. 304 (1921).
125. See Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON.
Ass'N 7, 55, 59-64 (1887).
126. See Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 375-79 (5 th ed. 1997) (describing
how the product differentiation revolution made the fixed cost controversy irrelevant). For
ILo8 2 [Vol. lo2:io63
APPRAISING THE PROGRESSIVE STATE
amount of market control, or monopoly power, simply because they were
differentiated to some degree from other firms, thus making perfect
competition impossible.127
At various times over the 2oth century economists and government policy
makers have had widely different views about both the ubiquity of market
failure and the value of state intervention as a corrective. For example, New
Deal policy rapidly expanded the domain of government regulation, an
expansion that lasted through the early 1970s.128 Beginning during the
twilight of the Carter administration and accelerating through the Reagan
administration, however, the federal government moved just as quickly to
"deregulate" practically every regulated industry.129
The Supreme Court's Carotene Products decision has become one of the
great constitutional symbols of the progressive revolution in economic
regulation.so That decision's expression of extreme deference to federal
economic regulation effectively brought the classical era of harsh judicial
scrutiny to an end.131 Interestingly, it was fundamentally not a "Roosevelt
Court" or even a progressive decision. Carotene Products was handed down in
April, 1938.132 At that time Roosevelt had made two appointments to the
Supreme Court,Justices Hugo Black and Stanley Reed.'33 Reed, who took his
seat only three months before the case was argued, did not participate in the
decision. The Court contained two Wilson appointees (McReynolds and
Brandeis), one Harding appointee (Butler), one Coolidge appointee (Stone,
who wrote the opinion), and three Hoover appointees (ChiefJustice Hughes,
Roberts, and Cardozo, who also did not participate).134 Two of the original
"four horsemen" (McReynolds and Butler) who had opposed a great deal of
New Deal legislation, were still on the bench.'ss In all, four of the seven
example, Chamblin's monopolistic competition model reaches equilibrium when price equals
long-run average cost, a measure that includes fixed costs and can be significantly above marginal
cost. See ROBERT B. EKFLUND, JR. & ROBERT F. HEBERT, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY &
METHOD 513-16 (6th ed. 2014).
127. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 78-79.
128. The classic study is ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY:
ASTUDYIN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966).
129. For good historical discussions, see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); MARTHA
DERTHICK & PAULJ. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation:
Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 325 (1990).
130. See generaliy United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 3o4 U.S. 144 (1938).
131. See id. at 154 ("The prohibition of shipment in interstate commerce of appellee's
product, as described in the indictment, is a constitutional exercise of the power to regulate
interstate commerce.").
132. Id. at 144 .
133. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 267.
134. See id. at 266-67.
135. See id. The other two were Willis Van Devanter, who had retired in 1937 and would be
replaced by Hugo Black, and George Sutherland, who had retired three months earlier and was
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participatingJustices were appointed by Republican presidents.36 One of the
two participating Democrat appointees, McReynolds, ended up being one of
the Court's most conservative members and was the lone dissenter. In sum,
Carotene Products was decided with only two Democratic appointees (Brandeis
and Black) in the majority.'57 Further, while Justice Black concurred in the
result, he expressly refused to go along with that portion of the opinion
marked "Third," which was the section containing the famous "Footnote
Four," which reserved a higher standard of review for statutes that injure
discrete and insular minorities.ss The Court's personnel would change
dramatically, however. By the time Roosevelt died seven years later he had
replaced every seat on the Supreme Court except that of Owen Roberts.x39
The result was a sharp turnaround, on questions of race as well as economic
regulation.140
III. EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE
The economic policy of the progressive state is both experimental and
decidedly "mixed," which means that it relies on a combination of private
rights, markets, and government intervention to produce its results.
Progressives were and remain strongly committed instituitonalists. They
understand that traditional markets are only one of many ways that resources
move through society, and not always the best one. In addition, progressive
policy is seldom fixed, but tends to vary with developments in science,
economics, demographics, politics, or the pull of interest groups. In the
progressive state, most means of production remain privately owned,
although with significantly more government intervention than is true of a
more classical state. In sum, the underlying principles of the progressive state
are more complex and considerably less elegant than those of classicism,
libertarianism, or any other theory that employs more categorical, less
empirically driven conceptions about the appropriate roles of government
and the market.
This pragmatism has contributed to an image that the progressive state
is unstable and, to a certain extent, lacking in ideological commitment. It also
lacks some of the rhetorical advantages of more laissez-faire alternatives. For
example, it is quite easy to formulate arguments that taxes produce
succeeded by Stanley Reed. On the Four Horsemen, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 559-61 (997), who observes that they were actually much more
complex than caricatured in the popular literature. On how the "Four Horsemen" acquired their
name, see HOVENKAMP, supra note i at 267.
136. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 267.
137. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 144.
138. Id. at 1 5 2 n.4.
139. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 267-68. Roberts left the Court in July, 1945, three
months after Roosevelt had died.
140. See Hovenkamp, supra note 25 (manuscript at 44-49.
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deadweight loss and inefficiency by raising producers' marginal costs, or that
minimum wage laws do a version of the same thing, thus destroying jobs. By
contrast, theories favoring government spending and higher wages are more
complex. In the case of taxes for infrastructure and other government
services, their success is often thought to depend on theoretically
controversial "multiplier" effects-namely, that government stimulation
induces additional investment and employment in complementary markets,
boosting parts of the economy beyond the market where the investment was
made.'4' For example, a river bridge costing the government $20,000,000
might produce many times that in the saving of transportation and commute
times, increasing the size of the job market, which, in turn, produces more
goods and services, and so on.142 The effect of multipliers can be either
positive or negative, depending on how the money is spent and what its ripple
effects are.'14 Further, they are likely to be harmful to the extent that
government spending is inefficient because of special interest capture. This
includes unjustified regulation which often has a negative impact on
consumers and competitors of those seeking the regulation, or investment in
unnecessary infrastructure or other projects. In any event, the very existence
of multipliers requiring a governmental cure presupposes a broader theory of
market failure than neoclassical economics has traditionally allowed. After all,
if these multiplier gains were there to be had, private investors would have
corrected the problem.
The story on wages presents similar issues. High wages increase
employers' marginal costs, but they also increase employee spending power
in areas that the employer does not control. Critics typically look at the first
part, the impact on marginal cost, while playing down or ignoring the second
part. Progressives, by contrast, usually look at both blades of the scissors,
where the story is more complex. Positive welfare effects of mandated higher
141. A multiplier is the ratio of enhanced income or growth to spending intended to
stimulate it. See generally HUGO HEGELAND, THE MULTIPLIER THEORY (1966).
142. See John F. Cogan et al., New Keynesian Versus Old Keynesian Government
Spending Multipliers 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14782, 2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/W14782.pdf. See generally THE KEYNESIAN MULTIPLIER (Claude
Gnos & Louis-Philippe Rochon eds., 2008). On the multiplier effects of federal spending during
the New Deal as well as comparison with multiplier effects of more recent spending, see Price V.
Fishback, How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of New Deal Spending and
Lending Policies in the 193OS 20-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21925,
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21925.pdf.
143. On some of the problems in tax policy, see generally Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and
Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALEJ. ON REG. 45
(2012). Multiplier effects can also drive business cycles, by producing both positive and negative
immediate effects that have significant repercussions in related markets. See generallyJ.R. HICKS,
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE (1950); A.W. MULLINEUX, THE BUSINESS
CYCLE AFTER KEYNES: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS (1984).
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wages become possible, depending on the size of the increase, the consumer
savings rate, and the extent of spillover effects.144
Political theories such as progressivism, with their strong commitments
to institutional diversity, are more cumbersome and rhetorically less
appealing than theories that can point to a single institution, the market, as
central to all resource movement. The theory of well-functioning markets is
rhetorically powerful, universal, and easy to articulate. By contrast, market
failures are more complex and more idiosyncratic, in the sense that the failure
and appropriate corrective can vary considerably from one market to another.
When markets succeed they are all more-or-less alike and the best policy
approach, which is letting them alone, works for all. By contrast, when they
fail their failures are unique and require distinct fixes. They are like the
marriages in Anna Karenina.45 Further, because markets change with
technology and demographics, progressive policy has always been subject to a
relatively high degree of doing and redoing. That was particularly true during
the New Deal era, when so much of federal regulation was being written on a
clean slate. Even today, however, many changes in regulatory policy are driven
by technological change.
These observations naturally invite questions about performance, or how
well the progressive state fares in producing results that are important to
social well-being. Performance can be measured in many different ways.
Economic growth, wealth, or security may have to be traded against
competing values, such as individual property or liberty rights, or the
expression of religious or other values, or distribution. Market efficiency
theses are elegant and simple largely because they make questions about
distribution irrelevant, or nearly so. By contrast, a multi-institutional
approach to resource management is likely to include concerns about
distribution, even though they are difficult to manage. In addition, high
economic growth may increase volatility, and some might value stability more
than expansion.
Nevertheless, few would deny that economic performance is important.
The state that does better at providing growth, jobs, or wealth may also be in
a better position to protect other rights as well, and it hardly seems that there
is an inverse correlation between the two. For example, the former Soviet state
and the government of North Korea offer both very poor economic
performance and systematic deprivation of a wide range of individual rights.
Libertarians and conservatives have been particularly critical of the
progressive state because of its propensity to special interest capture. The core
of their argument is that too much progressive decision-making occurs
144. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFIcE, THE EFFECTS OF A MINIMUM-WAGE INCREASE ON
EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY INcOME (2014), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/4 4 995-MinimumWage.pdf.
145. See LEO ToLSTOY, ANNA KARENiNA 1 (1877) (Constance Garnett trans., 2000) ("Happy
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."). Thanks to Suzanna Sherry.
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through legislation and agency regulation, two types of law making that are
particularly prone to capture. One important element of this public choice
critique is that regulation and special interest capture harm economic
performance.46 By contrast, the free market and the common law are
relatively immune to capture. If that is true it should be easy to show that the
progressive state performs poorly by comparison to these alternatives.
Most of these critiques suffer from some version of the Nirvana fallacy.
That is, they criticize the progressive state by comparing it to the rhetorically
powerful vision of the free market that neoclassical economics offers. What
they do not do, however, is compare the performance of the progressive state
to actual historical alternatives. If one does that, a very different story appears.
Even by conventional neoclassical measures that ignore wealth distribution as
a factor, the progressive state appears to have performed better than more
conservative or laissez-faire alternatives in the United States during the same
time period, and even better than the much vaunted i9 th century that
preceded it. Growth in GDP (real Gross Domestic Product per capita) during
the i 9 th century (roughly 1.4%-1.5% per year overall) was significantly lower
than it was after progressive policy appeared on the scene, notwithstanding
the 1 9 th century's heavy free-market orientation, lack of publicly financed
safety nets or high taxes or other significant involvement in wealth
distribution, and very considerable progress in technology.,47 Even the
146. See infta notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
147. The Government has computed GDP each quarter since 1929. GDP for earlier periods
can be estimated, however, and these estimates generally show that 1 9 th century growth was more
volatile but generally not higher overall. For one set of estimates going back to 1871, see LK, US Real
Per Capita GDP from 1870-2001, Soc. DEMOCRACY FOR 21ST CENTURY (Sept 24, 2012, 3:43 AM),
http://socialdemocracy2 istcentury.blogspot.com/ 2012/og/us-real-per-capita-gdp-from-1 8702
ooi.html. According to these estimates, decadal growth rates since i960 have exceeded 1 9 th century
rates after 1870. See id.; see also Thomas Weiss, U. S. Labor Force Estimates and Economic Growth,
18oo-i86o, inAMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWrH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING BEFORE THE CIVtL WAR 19
31 tbl.1. 3 (Robert E. Gallman &JohnJoseph Wallis eds., 1992) (showing 18oo-186o GDP growth
in a range from 0.85% to 3.10%, although only one decade (1850-1860) is above 3.0). Table 1.4
shows higher growth rates during the period from the American Revolution to 181o. See id. at 34
tbl. 1.4. Estimates show very low real GDP per capita growth during the overall period 8oo-1 840
(0.69% on average, although highly variable), higher growth during the period 1840-188o
(1.84%), and more moderate growth during 1880-1920 (1.32%). See Samuel H. Williamson,
Annualized Growth Rate of Various Historical Economic Series, MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.
measuringworth.com/m/calculators/growth (check the box next to "US"; then enter the date
ranges in the "Select years" boxes and click "Calculate") (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (permitting
estimates of GDP growth going back to the beginning of the 1 9 th century). Real GDP per capita
growth was 2.75% from 1940 to 1980 and 2.28% from 1980 to 2000. Id. The American Economic
Association endorses the MeasuringWorth site, noting that the author, economic historian Samuel
H. Williamson, acknowledges that the quality of the data is more problematic as one goes back
further in time. RFE: Resources for Economists on the Internet, AM. ECON. ASS'N, https://www.
aeaweb.org/rfe/showRes.php?rfe-id=17&catjid=3 (last visited Dec. 10, 2016). The statistic most
generally used here is Real GDP per capita, which is GDP per person, adjusted by time in comparison
with a base year. Nearly all of these i 9 th century growth numbers would be considered quite
mediocre by today's standards.
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railroad-induced growth of the 1840 to 186o pre-Civil War period (roughly
1.75%) or the Gilded Age's technology-induced economic growth during
188o to 1900 (roughly 1.9%) falls far below growth during progressive
administrations that would be regarded as mediocre.148
Economic growth data for the i 9 th century must be pieced together after
the fact, making assessments omewhat less reliable. But even if 1 9 th century
growth were proven to be much greater, head-on comparison would be
inappropriate. During the igth century, the United States was a developing
country playing catch-up. Undeveloped nations generally grow more quickly
than developed ones. In any event, progressive policy has appeared overall to
be a very considerable inducement to economic growth.
New Deal economic policy was the first to use a broad combination of
taxation and spending policies in order to manage economic growth and
distribution. For the most part, New Deal policy makers were writing on a
clean slate, and their error rate must be read in that light. Nevertheless, more
active management very likely contributed heavily to the smaller size and
shorter duration of extreme recessions since that time, including the very
large recession of 2007 to 2oo8.149 At the same time, the motivations for New
Deal management were both economic and political. For example, the
Roosevelt administration pumped more money into areas where
unemployment was higher and poverty more widespread, but many of these
also happened to be areas that were more likely to swing Democrat.5o The
distribution also reflected the power of individual members of Congress,'5'
and particularly the Roosevelt administration's favoritism toward the South,
where Roosevelt was politically vulnerable.'a= New Deal growth in federal
spending contributed significantly to the rise of personal incomes, suggesting
overall returns that exceeded outlays, although they were variable.'ss
Federally financed public-work projects produced particularly strong returns
in the form of improved economic performance at the local level.'54 By
contrast, the impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act is ambiguous and
difficult to assess.'ss Overall, however, when one uses microeconomic
measures of performance to evaluate the New Deal with 8o years of hindsight,
it appears to have succeeded in stimulating both income and durable goods
148. See Williamson, supra note 147.
149. See Fishback, supra note 142, at 8-so (presenting a well-documented and
methodologically explicit study which contains an exhaustive bibliography).
150. Id. at 1 5-16.
151. Id. at 16.
152. On Roosevelt's strategy of keeping the South in the democratic coalition through
appeasement, see KATZNELSON, supra note 3, at 131-224.
153. Fishback, supra note 142, at 21-23. See generally Price Fishback & Valentina
Kachanovskaya, The Multiplierfor Federal Spending in the States During the Great Depression, 75J. ECON.
HIST. 125 (2015).
154. Fishback, supra note 142, at 30.
155. See id. at 37-40.
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consumption, and reducing mortality and crime rates, although perhaps not
private unemployment.56
On economic performance subsequent to the New Deal, the most
numerous and useful comparative statistics concerning economic
performance align with the political party owning the White House, which is
certainly an imperfect surrogate. Some Republicans, such as Richard Nixon
and Ronald Reagan, have been much more progressive than others.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the political parties has followed a progressive/
conservative divide on many fundamental points, with Republicans generally
urging smaller government, less regulatory intervention, lower taxes, less
regulation of wages and working conditions, and opposition to labor unions.
By contrast, Democrats to various degrees have supported government growth
and regulation and, to some extent, higher taxes and support for organized
labor, as well as a greater commitment to wealth redistribution. These
differences have generally been more pronounced since the 198os than they
were previously, and were quite extreme during the 2016 election cycle.
Another problem with using presidential administrations as data points
is that the number is relatively small. There were eighteen elections from
Truman through Obama's first term, or 23 elections if one includes Hoover
and FDR. The result is a small sample, but a very wide disparity in
performance.
The statistics on basic economic growth are quite stunning. Growth in
real GDP per capita per year is not merely higher under Democrat presidents,
it is roughly 70% higher. Going back through the administration of Harry
Truman, GDP growth increased at a rate of 4,35% under Democrat Presidents
as opposed to 2.54% under Republicans.57 The factual record, based on
generally available statistics's5 is reliable, although the authors of the most
prominent report comparing administrations' decline to relate the
differences to presidential economic policy.lss
The government has actively kept statistics on GDP since 1929 to 193o,160
which go back further than Truman and covers all of the Franklin D.
Roosevelt presidency and three years of Herbert Hoover's. If one includes
these, the differences are even more pronounced, approaching two-to-one.
Annual GDP growth during the included three years of Herbert Hoover's
presidency (1930 to 1932) was approximately -io%, while during FDR's
156. See id. at 62-63.
157. Alan S. Blinder & Mark W. Watson, Presidents and the US. Economy: An Econometric
Exploration, 1o6 AM. EcoN REv. 1015, 1017 (2o16).
158. See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, U.S. GDP by Year Compared to Recessions and Major Events,
BALANCE (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305 543.
159. Blinder & Watson, supra note 157, at 1043.
16o. These statistics are currently kept by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which is part of the Department of Commerce. See National Economic Accounts, BUREAU ECON.
ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
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administration it was around +8.0%.6o That comparison is unfair, however,
because the Hoover administration reflected the worst years of the Great
Depression, while the Roosevelt years reflected both the recovery and the
rapid growth caused by the lead-up to World War II. As a result, both Hoover's
highly negative number and FDR's highly positive one are best considered as
outliers.
Other comparisons are noteworthy.6 2 For example, average annual GDP
growth during the eight years of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, a
Republican hero, was no higher (term 1, 3.12%; term 2, 3.89%; average,
3.51%) than growth underJimmy Carter (3.56%), whom Reagan supporters
have vilified.163 In fact, the only post-War presidents to produce higher
numbers were Kennedy/Johnson (shared term, 5.74%), Johnson (4.95%)
and Clinton (term 1, 3.53%; term 2, 4.03%; average, 3-78%).64 Both
Presidents George H.W. Bush (2.05%) and George W. Bush (term 1, 2.78%;
term 2, .054%; average, 1.42%) also fared much more poorly.,65
The story on jobs and employment is even more telling. Numbers
concerning job creation are more significant than GDP growth to the extent
that they reflect the shorter-term effects of presidential administrations and
distinctive policies directed at labor and employment. In any event, job
creation and GDP growth are strongly correlated, moving almost in tandem
since the ig60s.'66 The same thing cannot be said of tax cuts. Considerable
evidence suggests that cuts in marginal tax rates have no measurable impact
on economic growth.,67 Further, to the extent a correlation exists it is between
161. National Data, BUREAU EcoN. ANALYSIS, https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?Req
ID=g&step=1#reqid=g&step=1 &isuri=1 &904=1930&903=5&906=a&905=1945&910=x&91 1=o
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (Click "Section i-Domestic Product and Income"; click "Table 1 1.1.
Percent Change in Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product (A) (Q)"; click "Modify"; select
"Annual" and set the first year as "1930-A" and the last year as "1 9 4 5-A"; click "Refresh Table.").
162. For example, Total Factor Productivity ("TFP") growth has been roughly twice as high
in Democrat administrations. Blinder & Watson, supra note 157, at 1021. TFP is a measure of
productive efficiency considering the extent to which the value of outputs exceeds the value of
inputs (labor and capital). The surplus, or difference, is attributed in significant part to
innovation. See generally Charles R. Hulten, Total Factor Productivity: A Short Biography, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCIITYANALYsIs 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Studies in Income
and Wealth Ser. No. 63, 2001).
163. Blinder & Watson, supra note 157, apps. at 4 tbl. A-3.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Russ Koesterich, Why Job Creation and GDP Growth Go Hand-in-Hand, MARKET REALIsT (Feb.
13, 2015, 10:o9 AM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/02/job-creation-gdpgrowth-go-hand-hand.
167. See Henry Blodget, Bombshell- New Study Destroys Theory that Tax Cuts Spur Growth, Bus. INSIDER
(Sept 21, 2012, 7:59 AM), http://www.businessisider.com/study-tax-cuts-dont-lead-to-growth-2012-
9; see also WILLIAM GALE ET AL., THE GROWIH MIRAGE: STATE TAX CuTs Do NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD
To EcONOMIc GROWTH 6 (2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/
publication-pdfs/2000377-the-growth-mirage.pdf (finding o correlation between tax cuts and
growth); William G. Gale et al., The Relationship Between Taxes and Growth at the State Level New Evidence,
68 NAT'LTAXJ. 919, 938 (2015) (same).
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economic growth and tax cuts at the bottom of the income ladder. There is
no measurable correlation between tax cuts to higher earners andjob growth.
The most likely explanation for this is that tax cuts to employers do little to
stimulate job creation but result mainly in more savings. By contrast, tax cuts
to lower wage earners enables them to spend more, stimulating growth in the
process.,68
Both real nonfarm wages and labor productivity have increased more
quickly under Democrats than under Republicans. Further, Democratic
presidents have overseen the creation of roughly twice as many private-sector
jobs per year as Republican administrations.'69 During its eight years, the
Reagan administration saw a smaller increase in jobs per year (roughly two
million) than the Carter administration (roughly 2.55 million).,70 Overall,
annual job growth was the best during the administrations of Presidents
Clinton, Carter, andJohnson.'7' However, recent job growth in the Obama
administration enabled him to finish his presidency with a similar record as
well.172 In any event, the economy produced many more newjobs during the
Obama administration (roughly 15 million) than the eight years of the Bush
administration (roughly 1.3 million).17s Household income growth as of
January 2013, five years into President Obama's presidency, lagged behind
Reagan and Clinton, particularly for older Americans; but it was very far ahead
of rates under both Presidents Bush.'74 Overall, these data show that older
168. See Owen M. Zidar, Tax Cuts for Whom? Heterogeneous Effects ofIncome Tax Changes on Growth
and Employment i (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper NO. 21035, 2015) (finding a
positive correlation between income tax cuts andjob growth in lower tax brackets, but no correlation
with respect to tax cuts for the top so% of earners); see also Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Tax Cuts Boost
Jobs,Just Not When TargetedatRich, WALLSTREETJ. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/ 2015/04/ 20/tax-cuts-boostjobsjust-not-when-targeted-at-rich.
169. See Rich Exner, jobs Numbers Stronger Under Democratic Presidents Historically; But Details Ofer




172. See Bill McBride, Public and Private SectorPayrollJobs: Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama,
CALCUIATEDRISK (Apr. 1, 2016,7:33 PM), http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2016/04 /public-and-
private-sector-payrolljobs.html (noting that Obama is on track to finish his second term with
10,48o,ooo jobs added); see also Paul Waldman, Guess What: Barack Obama has Been a Great President for
Job Creation, WASH. PosT: PLUM LINE (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/wp/ 2016/os /o8/guess-what-barack-obama-has-been-a-great-president-for-job-creation/?utm
term=.825f4 a69827f (predicting that 16 million jobs will be created by the end of Obama's second
term).
173. Heather Long, The Obama Economy Has Now Created 15 Million Jobs, CNN: MONEY (Oct 7,
2016, 9:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2os6/10/07/news/economy/obama-15-millionjobs.
174. See ROBERTJ. SHAPIRO, INCOME GROWTH AND DECLINE UNDER RECENT U.S. PRESIDENTS
AND THE NEW CHALLENGE TO RESTORE BROAD ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 3 fig.2 (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/o6/ShapiroV3.pdf. In 2015, the last
year for which the Census Bureau has released data, older households continued to show some
of the lowest rates of household income growth. BERNADETTE B. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 5 tbl. 1 (2015).
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Americans (above 45), and particularly those without a college education, are
lagging behind in income growth in all administrations.
The historical record is much the same on wages, labor unions and
collective bargaining. Few areas have served to divide the progressive state
from its critics more than attitudes toward labor unions. Progressives began
to observe at the beginning of the 20th century that shareholders are unified
into a single person by virtue of corporate legal personality, while labor unions
are treated as cartels.'s For them, this fact explained why labor needed to be
organized in order to get its fair share. Today, thanks in part to a rising tide
of anti-union activity and the growth of right-to-work provisions, labor is
receiving an ever declining share of the benefits of increased productivity, 7
and wages in strong right-to-work states are lower than those in the nation as
a whole.'77 That fact itself explains a significant portion of the increasing
disparity of wealth in the country: wages are growing much more slowly than
productivity.78 The result is that the benefits of increased productivity are
accruing mainly to capital.
The historical relationship between marginal tax rates and economic
growth also gives little support to the anti-progressive argument for
continually reducing taxes of most types. One Congressional Research Service
report in 2012 found little to no evidence that higher marginal tax rates
impeded economic growth, although lower tax rates on upper income ranges
contributed noticeably to uneven wealth distribution.'79 That study concluded
that historically "higher tax rates are associated with slightly higher real per
capita GDP growth rates."so Today inequality is at its highest point in a
century, and a reversal could be a major boost to growth, both domestically,"
and worldwide.182
175. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 89.
176. See generally Robert Z. Lawrence, The Growing Gap Between Real Wages and Labor Productivity,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (July 21, 2015, 2 30 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-
economic-issues-watch/growing-gap-between-real-wages-and-labor-productivity; The Productivity-Pay
Gap, ECON. POLICYINsT., http://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap (last updated Aug. 2016).
177. See generally ELISE GOULD & WILL KIMBALL, "RIGHT-TO-WORK" STATES STILL HAVE
LOWER WAGES (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Raising America's Pay Briefing Paper No. 395, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/82934.pdf.
178. See The Productivity-Pay Gap, supra note 176.
179. See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4 2729 , TAXES AND THE
ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at 4-12 (2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/r42729o917 .pdf.
i8o. Id. at g. For sharply opposing views, see generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE
BETTER THAN THIS: How GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2015) (advocating
increasing revenue); and MICHAEL D. TANNER, GOING FOR BROKE: DEFICITS, DEBT, AND THE
ENTITLEMENT CRISIS (2015) (advocating cutting taxes further).
181. See Nicholas Parker, Divergence: Wealth and Income Inequality in the United States,
ECONSOUTH, Sept.-Dec. 2014, at 5, https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/regional-
economy/econsouth/2014/14q4-divergence-wealth-income-inequality.pdf.
182. For worldwide conclusions, see generally ERA DABLA-NORRIS ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND,
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Even when statistics such as these are not gamed, they virtually never end
any debates. Nevertheless, one inescapable conclusion is that no general
empirical case can be made that progressive policy has harmed the United
States economy, at least not when it is compared to historical alternatives. To
the contrary, the shoe is on the other foot.
Nevertheless, to return to the point that opened this section, economic
growth is hardly the sole driver of policy choices. Many constituencies may
have strong preferences for other values, even to the point of prioritizing
economic growth to a lesser degree in order to obtain them. That is, no one
lobbies for higher economic growth in the abstract. In any event, these are
value judgments and there is little point in debating them. Rather, my
conclusion here is a humbler one: to the extent that the progressive state's
success is measured by its economic record, comparatively speaking it has
done quite well, notwithstanding the amount of meandering and
experimentation in its policy choices. In any event, the data on performance
should suffice to shift the burden of proof to those arguing against progressive
policies on economic grounds.
IV. CAPTURE AND THE PROGRESSIVE STATE
As discussed earlier, one prominent criticism of the progressive state
from libertarian and conservative voices is the increased likelihood of special
interest capture.83 "Capture" occurs when an interest group or small number
of individuals is able to assert disproportionate control over democratic
decision-making. The result can be state policies that do not reflect the
"public" interest, but rather represent the interests of the group in control.
The effects can range from cartel-like results where the cartel profits at the
expense of competitors and consumers; excessive bureaucracy and rigidity,
making it difficult for governments to respond to social or technological
change; or unappealing wealth transfers. Over its lengthy history, the theory
of capture has been described many ways and given many names.184 Its study
has ranged from casual observation to heavily empirical to purely theoretical.
As a general matter, legislation and agency regulation at all government levels
are identified as particularly prone to capture. Unregulated markets and the
common law are relatively resistant.
The relationship between capture and economic growth has been an
important subject of macroeconomic thought for decades, and has included
such diverse writers as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, as well as
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME INEQUALHY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2015), https://
www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2015 /sdn I513.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IN IT
TOGETHER. WHY LESS INEQUALiY BENEFrrs ALL (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-al978926423512o-en.
183. See supra text accompanying note 146.
184. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 3o8-14.
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Francis Fukuyama. Although they disagree sharply about many things,
85 all
emphasize the extent to which capture and crony capitalism can inhibit
economic growth. 86 Fukuyama's favorite term for capture is "clientelism," or
the practice by which political administrations reward constituencies for
loyalty with various government perquisites.187 For example, the "spoils
system" of the Jackson era tended to make party loyalty rather than expertise
a qualification for the civil service. 88 By contrast, Acemoglu and Robinson
emphasize the harmful effects of "extractive" institutions that take resources
out of the economy for private benefit, rather than more inclusive institutions
that are either self-sustaining or that put resources in.'89
The concern with capture is hardly new. In the Federalist Papers, James
Madison fretted about the possibility that a representative democracy could
be captured by special interest groups for their own purposes, referring to
these groups as "factions.",'o When Charles Beard wrote his constitutional
histories during the Progressive Era, he used the term "economic
interpretation" to refer to the struggle between various interest groups in the
Constitution's formation.19' Beard argued that, although the population was
well over go% rural, the Constitution in fact represented the triumph of
urban merchants and creditors over agrarian debtors.192 Two generations
later the public choice literature referred to "interest group capture."'93
Writers about entitlements or regulation often speak of capture as "rent-
seeking."-94 Another term, "crony capitalism," suggests the same general
thing, although the emphasis is more typically on executive favoritism rather
than legislation. For example, crony capitalism might explain why a governor
185. On their differences, see generally Francis Fukuyama, Acemoglu and Robinson on Why Nations
Fail, AM. INT. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/2o12/03 /26/acemoglu-and-
robinson-on-why-nations-fail.
186. See DARON AcEMoGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 369-403 (2012); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND
POLITICAL DEcAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 7,
81-93, 126-48 (2014).
187. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 186, at 86-88.
188. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 328-66, 483-524 (2007) (discussing theJackson-era spoils system and
party loyalty).
189. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 186, at 73-76.
190. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. lo (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961)
(originally published on November 29, 1787).
191. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
192. Id.
193. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
194. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988).
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would pack an agency with people favorable to a certain position, or why a
state official might give monopoly rights to favored businesses.i95
. Capture has frequently been identified as a particular problem of the
progressive state, particularly during the New Deal Era..96 The Supreme
Court's Carolene Products decision itself provides evidence, with its expression
of trust in economic legislation even though the statute under consideration
was a thorough product of capture. The decision upheld special interest
legislation passed at the behest of the dairy industry to make illegal a
substitute for whipping cream that was both better performing and
healthier.97
But if the progressive state is so prone to capture, how is it that it appears
to achieve better economic performance than the alternatives? 98 That
question is perplexing, because a fundamental element of the capture thesis
is that captured regimes hinder economic growth by favoring special interests
over more public values.'99
One possible answer is that the regulatory state's superiority in economic
performance is so significant that it more than offsets the effects of capture.
Another answer, which I personally believe is better, is that the capture
critique has been built on an excessively impractical and narrow conception
of market failure. More precisely, the public choice literature that developed
the capture hypothesis has largely equated the public interest with the
unrestrained market and identified as "capture" most things that deviate from
that norm.
Welfare economics, which was significantly reconstructed in the mid-
1930s and after, came to conclude that economics as a science is unable to
rank social states based on interpersonal comparisons of subjective utility.20
195. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution:
A History of Crony Capitalism 36 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 983 (2013).
196. For an example, see James V. DeLong, The Coming of the Fourth American Republic, AMERICAN
(Apr. 21, 2oo9), https://www.aei.org/publication/the-coming-of-the-fourth-american-republic
(referring to the New Deal as "special interest capture on steroids"). Cf WilliamJ. Novak, A Revisionist
History of Regulatory Capture in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
How To LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (noting and challenging this
general assumption). See generally BURTON W. FOLSOM, JR., NEW DEAL OR RAw DEAL?: How FDR's
ECONOMIC LEGACY HAS DAMAGED AMERICA (2008).
197. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 305-o6. A version of the product is sold to this day
under the name "Milnot."
198. See supra Part III.
99. See William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 893 (1990) (similar); Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 302-03 (1974); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 624 (1969) (speaking of regulatory capture as "distort[ing] economically sound
judgments"). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROwrH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) (blaming capture for economic decline).
200. See generally LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE (1932);J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON.J. 696 (1939). For good
critiques, see generally I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1957), and the
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It was able to show, however, that perfectly competitive markets produce
Pareto optimal results.ol Other forms of social decision-making can never be
shown to be Pareto efficient unless they are the unanimous outcome of a
social choice process in which all affected persons are permitted to
participate.202 Building on this foundation, in the mid-1950s Paul Samuelson
and Francis M. Bator developed what became the dominant theory of
correctable market failure.2os These theoretical critiques were paralleled in
the legal literature by a harsh critique of the history of regulation up to that
time, including Special Counsel James M. Landis' very critical report on
regulatory agencies to President-elect Kennedy in 1960.204 Landis, who had
been a champion of New Deal regulation argued that the New Deal regulatory
state had become a mess of conflicting assertions of jurisdiction and control
of the process by the regulated firms themselves.os The ig60s then produced
harsh criticisms of government intervention in the economy. By using perfect
competition as a baseline, however, much of that work severely exaggerated
both the ubiquity and the effects of capture.2.o
A. MADISON'S INADEQUATE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO CAPTURE
The approach that Madison defended in The Federalist Papers for the
problem of special interests was entirely structural. This included
Representatives elected directly by the people for two-year terms,207 Senators
selected by state legislatures for six-year terms,2o8 and the President selected
by an electoral college for a four-year term.2 o Federal judges had lifetime
review by KennethJ. Arrow, Little's Critique of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REv. 923 (1951)-
For a summary of the debate, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 110-13.
201. This is the First Welfare Theorem, rigorously proven by GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF
VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (1959); Kenneth J. Arrow, An
Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 507 (Jerzy Neyman ed.,
195 1); KennethJ. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954).
202. This was initially proven in Kenneth J. Arrow, A Dificulty in the Concept of Social Wegfare,
58 J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950), and later elaborated in KENNETHJ. ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
203. See generally Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958);
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
204. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT (1960).
205. See id. Also see the excellent account in THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION
(1984).
206. See discussion supra section II.B.
207. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, Cl. 1.
208. Id. § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). This was changed to direct election by the Seventeenth
Amendment. Id. amend. XVII.
2o9. Id. art. H, § 1 (amended 1951). The presidency was limited to two terms by the Twenty-
Second Amendment. Id. amend. XXII.
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appointments. 2o Madison's theory was that constantly revolving,
asynchronous leadership terms would limit the formation of factions or
undermine their formation in the process.21' In addition, Madison advocated
for limits on the power of any faction to obtain legislation, which required a
majority of both Houses plus the President's signature.212 If the President
vetoed, then two-thirds of both Houses would be required for an override.-3
In any event, if the Constitution's intent was to eliminate capture with this set
of structural devices, it failed. Richard Epstein seems quite correct to
conclude that this purely structural approach to special interest capture was
"woefully inadequate."214
But a much more fundamental problem was at work, reflecting Madison's
own more laissez-faire ideology. Madison apparently assumed that the effect
of factions would show up in efforts to pass legislation, not in efforts to prevent
it from being passed. Under the Constitution's requirements, it is much easier
for a focused interest group to prevent a bill from being passed than to pass
one. For example, a faction that controlled the President and one-third of the
membership of one chamber would be sufficient to sustain a veto. A faction
that controlled just over half of one chamber would be sufficient to prevent
legislation even if the president and an overwhelming majority of the other
chamber approved it. Neither of these coalitions would be close to sufficient
to get a bill passed. So the Constitution's constraints on bill passage are
successful in limiting the power of factions if doing nothing is the baseline,
and the faction wants socially harmful legislation. These same limitations are
counterproductive, however, if the public interest requires legislation but a
faction opposes it.
Further, while the Constitution as Madison defended it took great care
to divide the power of government agents and institutions, nothing in the
Constitution addressed the capture problem directly. No language authorized
courts to strike down legislation simply because judges see it as a product of
capture. The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment can of course reach a
subset of instances where established property rights are taken from a
disfavored interest group.215 The First Amendment prohibits capture that
establishes or discriminates in favor of or against particular religious or other
ideological groups, and so on. The best candidate for a more general anti-
210. Id. art. III, § 1.
211. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1go, at 356-57 (James Madison) (Benjamin F.
Wright Ed., 1961) (originally published on February 6, 1788).
212. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1o, supra note igo, at 132-33.
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §, cl. 2.
214. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 22.
215. See generally, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S- 469 (2005); see also generally
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985);




capture provision is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which can be used to condemn legislation that singles out
particular groups for unreasonably favorable or unfavorable treatment.,6 But
the Equal Protection Clause as a limitation on state power did not come into
existence until 1868, and there is no similar express limitation on the powers
of Congress. In any event, an essential part of the progressive state was its
generally deferential Equal Protection and Due Process review of purely
economic legislation.-7 That deferential review has opened progressive state
policy to a harsh capture critique.21 8
The other interesting aspect of Madison's and the original Constitution's
approach to capture was that it completely ignored the states, even in its
structural limitations. While the Federal Constitution defined national
political leaders, their method of selection and unequal terms of office with
great specificity, it said nothing about state leadership. The only provision
limiting state capture prior to the Civil War was the Contract Clause,219 largely
intended to prevent debtor interests from undermining debts through
retrospective revision of payment obligations.220 Ironically, however, the
Contract Clause became a major source of capture, at least in the eyes of
Jacksonians in the 183os and after. For example, the Charles River Bridge case
in 1837 set the tone for a strong Jacksonian attack on Contract Clause
jurisprudence for creating perpetual monopoly rights and privileges for
favored interest groups.2 2 1 TheJacksonian constitutional law writers who gave
birth to substantive due process doctrine largely built their critique of special
interest legislation by attacking Marshall era contract clause jurisprudence.222
This Jacksonian offensive against monopoly grants and other corporate
216. E.g., St.Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that even
under the rational basis test, a statute that made it unlawful for all but licensed funeral directors
to sell caskets violated the Equal Protection Clause); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th
Cir. 2002) (ruling that a similar statute prohibiting the sale of caskets by all but licensed funeral
directors violated the Equal Protection clause under the rational basis test).
217. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
(upholding a special interest statute that forbade opticians from preparing eyeglasses without a
prescription from an ophthalmologist or an optometrist); Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793
F-3d 281, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. i i6o (2016) (upholding a special interest
statute that excluded non-dentists from whitening teeth of consumers after reviewing Supreme
Court decisions).
218. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 238, 220, 305-o6, 311-12 (deploring the rational basis
test).
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § lo, cl. 1.
220. The most comprehensive study is BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938). See also HOvENKAMP, supra note 38, at 17-35.
221. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 19-27; see also generally Proprietors of the Charles
River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
222. Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 22 (referring to Thomas M. Cooley, John F. Dillon,
Christopher Tiedeman, and Francis Wharton).
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special privileges granted by the states became the first American
"deregulation" movement.
B. CAPTURE AND THE CLASSICAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNREGULATED MARKET
AS BASELINE
The Taney Court confronted the problem of federal egislative capture in
1852, in Bloomer v. McQuewan, a patent case.22s In the process Chief Justice
Taney first stated what came to be substantive due process, although speaking
of the Fifth Amendment's clause that applies to the federal government.2 24
Bloomer involved two different, retroactive extensions of a patent term that the
patentee sought to apply against someone who purchased the patented good
prior to the term extensions and was required to pay royalties during the
patent's life.2z5 A general term extension in the 1836 Patent Act applied
retroactively to all previously issued patents.26 When that extension expired
the patentee's heirs went to Congress and obtained a second extension that
applied exclusively to his patent, mentioned by name.227 The Supreme Court
responded, not by making retroactive patent term extensions unlawful per se,
but instead by holding that once a buyer purchased a patented article, the
patent for which had expired, he could not be suffered to pay additional
royalties based upon a retroactive legislative extension. Once the "machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
monopoly."28 Further, Taney presciently added, any "special act of Congress,
passed afterwards," that deprives a person of the right to use property he had
already acquired "certainly could not be regarded as due process of law."2§
Economic substantive due process review of state legislation was born
from these Jacksonian roots. State courts adopted it during the Gilded Age
and the United States Supreme Court around the turn of the century.23o As a
result, what some see as a defining characteristic of substantive due process is
its efforts to combat capture.23' The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
clause became the undeclared constitutional statement against special
interests.
223. Seegenerally Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852).
224. Id. at553.
225. Id. at 547-48.
226. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117.
227. See, for example, An Act to Extend a Patent Heretofore Granted to William
Woodworth, ch. 27, 6 Stat. 936 (1845). See generally Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340
(1863) (describing the patent extensions).
228. Bloomer, 5 5 U.S. (14 How.) at 549.
229. Id. at 5 5 3.
230. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
231. See generally, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER- DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political
Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988).
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But substantive due process doctrine never evolved into an effective
vehicle for controlling capture. First, it simply assumed that the unregulated
market was the baseline from which capture should be measured. That was
certainly the tenor of the decisions that struck down wage and hour
legislation. Second, it was inattentive to facts. While progressive judges
generally assumed that legislation was passed in the public interest, as they
did in Carolene Products, substantive due process judges assumed just the
opposite, but also without investigation. Justice Peckham's Lochner opinion is
a good example.232 He observed that the Court could not "shut our eyes to
the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed under what is
claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public health
or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives."s33 However, the Court
neither cited nor insisted on evidence of these motives.34 The proponents of
the ten-hour law for bakers had argued that the statute was justified by
concerns for health.25 Initially supposing this to refer to the health of the
bakers themselves, Peckham concluded that such protection was illegitimate
because the workers were fully capable of contracting for it themselves and
did not require the state's paternalistic oversight.36 Peckham also rejected the
proposition that the statute was concerned for protecting the "healthful
quality of the bread" that the bakers produced, concluding that this was
incapable of proof.237
As noted previously, Peckham's approach was consistent with the "health,
safety, and morals" exceptions to substantive due process.238 Namely,
workplace and other regulations could bejustified on health or safety grounds
if the regulation applied to someone other than the people to whom the
regulation applied.39 These others would not be in a position to protect
themselves.24o The Court never required any factual determination of the
statute's actual effects or intended purpose, nor identification of the groups
232. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
233. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (go95).
234. See id.
235. Id. at 51.
236. Id. at 62.
237. Id. at 62-63 ("In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the connection
between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of the
bread made by the workman. The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy and thin to build any
argument for the interference of the legislature. If the man works ten hours a day it is all right,
but if ten and a half or eleven his health is in danger and his bread may be unhealthful, and,
therefore, he shall not be permitted to do it. This, we think, is unreasonable and entirely arbitrary.
When assertions such as we have adverted to become necessary in order to give, if possible, a
plausible foundation for the contention that the law is a 'health law,' it gives rise to at least a
suspicion that there was some other motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to
subserve the public health or welfare.").
238. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 54-56 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 54-56 and accompanying text.
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behind it. For all that it appears, substantive due process courts simply
inferred capture from a regulation that intervened in the market without an
adequate explanation justified by health, safety, or morals.
Even if the Court had attempted to identify the interest groups behind
the bakers' legislation, their mere existence is not a reliable sign of capture.
To be sure, interest groups are invariably selfish, whether or not their interests
coincide with those of the public. One serious error is to proclaim legislation
to be a sign of special interest capture merely because a particular interest
group was behind it. For example, wind turbine producers can be expected
to favor alternative energy subsidies, and health insurers very likely profit from
restrictions on smoking. The archery industry might profit from harsher gun
control. But this hardly means that legislation supporting alternative energy
or limiting smoking or guns is not in the public interest. One case in point is
the libertarian attempt to "rehabilitate" the Lochnerdecision by identifying the
interest groups behind it.2'4 The argument proceeds mainly by showing that
unionized bakers favored the legislation and campaigned for it as a way of
protecting their own agreements limiting working hours and improving
conditions.242 As a factual matter, that is true, although other interest groups
supported the legislation as well.243
In any event, the evidence about Lochner shows nothing more than that
statutory employment regulation was a good thing for competing unions, who
had reached similar outcomes through union bargaining.44 Competitors can
be expected to feel one way about a regulation, while producers of
complements, vertically related firms, and consumers feel a different way.
Nearly every rule with any impact at all produces these winners and losers,
and simply pointing out one of them is meaningless unless we know
something about the overall impact. Even the various Koch foundations'
lobbying against climate change legislation in order to protect investments in
oil drilling and refining does not establish that such legislation is beneficial.245
Determining that requires cost-benefit analysis that takes all affected interests
into account.
One cannot identify capture without having a baseline for determining
when a government act is truly in the public interest or when it represents
capture. One important characteristic of substantive due process judges was
241. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 231; EPSTEIN, supra note 28.
242. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 231; EPSTEIN, supra note 28.
243. For a contemporary glimpse at the diversity of interests behind Lochner, see War on Filthy
Bakeries: Women join in Striving for Needed Improvements, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1896), http://quely.
nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf res=9 505 E3D9 I 2 3EE33 3A2 5 7 5BCoA 9629 C9 467 9 ED7 CF
(describing organized efforts of both the principal bakers' union and the New York Ladies' Health
Protective Association to obtain the legislation that Lochner struck down).
244. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 272-73.
245. On the various Koch foundations' activities in opposition to climate action, see Global
Warming Skeptic Organizations, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global
warming/solutions/fight-misinformation/global-waming-skeptic.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
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that they saw the unregulated market as the baseline, defined by "liberty of
contract." Capture occurred when something deviated from this principle
without a good reason. Further, the burden of proof was on the proponents
of the legislation and the courts were to be the ultimate arbiter. This fact has
served to make the substantive due process era attractive to some libertarians
and conservatives today, because they agree about both the baseline and the
assignment of proof burdens.24
6
The unregulated market was also the baseline chosen by most mid-2oth-
century public choice writers.247 One important example is Mancur Olson,
whose influential 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action, has come to define
the antiregulatory branch of public choice theory.245 Olson was a graduate
student of Harvard economist Edward Chamberlin, one of the most
important industrial organization economists of the 193s.2 49 The Logic of
Collective Action began as a doctoral dissertation under Chamberlin's
supervision,2 50 and Olson borrowed heavily from Chamberlin's theory of
oligopolies and cartels. Under the theory, cartels work best when they consist
of homogenous members with the same set of interests, and when they are
small so that each of them has a large stake in the outcome.25s In addition,
the cartel managers must be able to detect "cheaters" and discipline them
effectively. Cheating by a member of a small group is much more disruptive
and thus easier to detect than in a large group.
Olson's brilliance was to apply this theory of cartels in traditional
economic markets to decision-making in democratic institutions, particularly
legislatures and regulatory agencies.2 52 According to him, the characteristics
of successful special interest groups are that they are small but homogenous
and well organized.253 They are then able to defeat larger, more diverse
groups that have less homogenous interests.254 For example, even though taxi
operators are few, the taxi operators earn their livelihood from taxis while taxi
fares represent a small part of the budgets of taxi passengers, who are a large
and diverse group. As a result, the taxi operators will actually show up, speak
more effectively to the decision-making body, and succeed in obtaining such
things as restrictions on the number of new taxicabs that can enter the market,
246. See generally, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 231; EPSTEIN, supra note 28.
247. Most, but not all. Important exceptions were writers from the political left. See generally
BEARD, supra note 191; GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965).
248. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
249. Mainly because of his work The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. EDWARD HASTINGS
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
250. Chamberlin died before Olson was able to finish.
251. See RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 196 (2008).
252. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (revised ed., 1971).
253. Id. at 5- 52.
254. Id.
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or higher fares. This illustration can readily be generalized to the problem of
legislative capture, providing an explanation for why single-sector regulatory
agencies serve the interests of regulated firms and their investors rather than
the general public. Importantly, the free market becomes the baseline, while
the special-interest cartel becomes the harmful deviation.
Olson subsequently extended these ideas, arguing that an inverse
relationship exists between interest group activity and economic growth.255
Once again he related interest groups to cartels, which he termed
"distributional coalitions," arguing that they were rigid and resistant to
technological change.256 The result, he predicted, was that as nations matured
they would become more susceptible to interest group activity, adversely
affecting their economic growth .257
Writing about the same time as Olson, James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock developed a theory of democratic and constitutional decision-making
driven by the need to limit rent-seeking.25S For them, as for Olson, the market
produced the baseline for identifying capture. Because market decisions are
made by unanimous consent, they are always Pareto improvements. Buchanan
and Tullock accepted unanimity as the most robust criterion for assessing
social choice.259 As a result it is easy to devise a model showing that capture is
impossible in a well-functioning, traditional economic market, which
transacts only by unanimous consent, while it is highly likely to occur in a
representative democracy. The message, of course, is that wherever possible
policy choices should be made by markets rather than by nonunanimous
legislation.
One qualification that Buchanan and Tullock discussed at some length
is the possibility of side payments that can mimic unanimous results when
gainers are able to compensate losers in full for their loss. So, for example, if
a practice is efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense,26 o perhaps producing $ioo
in gains to the supporters and $6o in losses to the opponents, then the gainers
could afford to compensate the opponents in full with some gain left over.
255. SeeFUKUYAMA, supra note 186, at481 (relying on Olson's book). See generally Olson, supra
note i9.
256. OLSON, supra note 199, at 62-65.
257. Id. at 65 (stating that distributional coalitions "slow down a society's capacity to adopt
new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby
reduce the rate of economic growth" (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 69-73 (arguing that
distributional coalitions move more slowly and increase bureaucracy).
258. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WORKS OF
GORDON TULLOCK 81-92 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2004).
259. Id. at 6. Unanimity is not the same thing as majoritarian direct democracy, however. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 25, 137 (critiquing majoritarian direct democracy because of its
tendency to trample on the individual rights of minorities).
260. A change is efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks (cost-benefit) sense if gainers gain enough to




That is just another way of saying, however, that everybody wins or is at least
indifferent, so we are right back at unanimity.261
Finally, KennethJ. Arrow's much more technical work on democracy and
voting made the same opening assumption about the proper baseline and
drew similar conclusions.262 Decisions made by the unanimous consent of all
affected people are Pareto optimal and capable of defining a social welfare
function, which is a social state that can be shown to be both stable and
superior to alternatives.63 By contrast, Arrow showed, decision-making by
majority voting or other nonunanimous coalitions can never achieve that
result because it is prone to instability and cycling, making it dependent on a
dictator's decisions about how the agenda is to be set.264
C. OBJECTIVE WELFARE JUDGMENTS
One prominent feature of Progressive regulation is welfare judgments
that are "objective" in the sense that they do not actually count or weigh
individual preferences. In other words, these judgments do not depend on
any actual determination that people have specific preferences, but rather on
an assumption that rational people would have them.265
Objective welfare judgments do not make the capture problem go away.
To the contrary, special interests might control the distribution of wealth,
objectively measured. When policy is based on objective welfare judgments,
however, market-based critiques have much less bite. The two critiques apply
different criteria for assessing welfare.
Progressive welfare policy, which developed in the early 2oth century and
became a central part of the federal safety net during and after the New Deal,
defined "welfare" mainly in objective terms.266 The criteria included things
such as wealth, food, clothing, shelter and education. Progressive welfare
policy has done some version of that ever since.267 The use of such criteria
261. See generally BUCHANAN &TULLOCK, supra note 258. In any event, in most public voting
settings, side payments in exchange for vote changes are unlawful. SeeAkhil Reed Amar, The Case
of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, io6 HARv. L. REV. 124, 141 (1992).
262. See generally ARROW, supra note 202.
263. Id.
264. Id. For critiques and discussions of limitations, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990); Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
265. On the development of objective welfare criteria during the Progressive Era, see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 16, 75, 98-100, 122.
266. Id.
267. On the use of objective welfare judgments in policy, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4 (1994); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63 (1ggo). On objective welfare
judgments in health care systems, see generally Thomas L. Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does
It Take toFix the Health Care System?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1825 (1998). See also HOVENKAMP, supra note
i, at 113-14 (providing a brief history of the use of objective judgments by post-New Deal
agencies).
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entails two things. First, actual counting of preferences becomes less
important, although not irrelevant. The progressive state relies mainly on
objective measures that are often taken from the health or social sciences
about what contributes to welfare. As a result, objective welfare judgments are
aggregated over larger populations rather than reflecting purely individual
preferences.
Second, objective welfare judgments enable progressive policy to take
wealth distribution into account in a way that neoclassical economics was
largely unable to do after the mid-193os. During the 1930s neoclassical
welfare economics largely read interpersonal utility comparisons out of
economic science because they were not verifiable. In the process, the
discipline very largely lost its ability to rank social orderings on the basis of
distributional criteria.268 By contrast, because objective judgments relate
welfare to some "basket" of goods or qualities that can be measured, wealth
distribution once again becomes a welfare concern. This makes objective
welfare judgments particularly relevant in times when concerns for wealth
distribution are prominent, as they were during the Gilded Age when the
original Progressive movement was forming, 69 and today when wealth
distribution is once again very lopsided.
The other place where objective welfare judgments are dominant is in
technical regulation of markets based on microeconomic theory. For
example, the treatment of natural monopoly in economics literature typically
does not examine individual preferences at all. It simply illustrates that in a
natural monopoly, which is typically characterized by high fixed costs, the
equilibrium minimally profitable price rises as the number of firms increases
above one. As a result, under the traditional formulation one gets the best
results in such a market by limiting the number of sellers to one and using
price regulation to prevent the firm from taking advantage of its monopoly
status. To the extent "preference" is at issue, it is no more than an inference
that consumers prefer higher output and lower prices.
That these technicaljudgments drive a great deal of economic regulation
is beyond dispute, as is evidenced by the distribution of regulation across
markets. For example, if the decision to regulate prices were purely a function
of special interest capture, then one would expect to see such schemes
scattered over a randomized set of industries. But the landscape that we
actually have exhibits competitively structured industries in which prices are,
for the most part, set by the market, and natural monopolies such as public
utilities where retail prices are mainly regulated by agencies. That is to say, the
system gets it right, or at least reflects a coherent theory, most of the time. To
be sure, historically the domain of price regulation has exhibited anomalies-
"regulatory mismatches" such as trucking, as then-Professor Breyer once
268. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 110-13.
269. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
2017] 1105
IOWA LAW REVIEW
observed. Those could be either signs of capture, deficiencies in theory, or
some elements of both.270
D. CAPTURE AND INACTION
One important insight of the progressive revolution was that markets can
and do fail more often than classicists had supposed. The problem of capture
hardly goes away in a society where market failure is relatively common. It
does take on a much different look, however. Mainly, non-intervention can
no longer be assumed as the baseline.
When the unregulated market does not provide a baseline, then capture
can become much more difficult to identify. Most importantly, failure to
regulate may be just as much a sign of capture as regulation itself. Even when
a market does not perform well, some special interests will profit from its
unregulated state. To the extent that these interest groups can prevent
regulatory legislation from occurring we can get "capture" in the other
direction. Further, in such cases the Constitution's restrictive set of checks
and balances may produce a perverse result to the extent that not doing
anything is easier than doing something. That is, under the Madisonian
Constitution it is typically far easier for a special interest group to obstruct
good legislation than it is for it to facilitate bad legislation.27
To illustrate, over the last few decades, some of the most controversial
regulatory issues involve tobacco, firearms, and the environment. All three
exhibit strong signs of special interest capture-namely, firms and other
entities with well-organized specific interests over a large and diverse
population. The result has been: (1) significant resistance and delays to
warnings, limits on advertising, and other restrictions on the dissemination of
cigarettes; (2) heavy and quite successful resistance to gun control and tort
responsibility for gun manufacturers; and (3) continued resistance to
stronger limitations on fossil fuels in order to combat environmental harm.272
Weapons manufacturers have obtained immunity from tort law, which means
that the manufacturers lack the incentive to make handguns and other
weapons safer or less promiscuous.73 One particularly troublesome
exemption is legislation passed in 1996 preventing the Center for Disease
27o. For Breyer's treatment of mismatch generally, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND
ITs REFORM 191-96 (1982). For mismatch and airlines, see id. at 197-221; for mismatch and the
trucking industry, see id. at 222-39; and for a look at mismatch and how it pertains to rent control
and wholesale natural gas prices, see id. at 240-60.
271. See supra Part V.A.
272. See generally James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
87 (2014). In the international context, see Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Model of International
Climate Change Negotiations, 19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 14, 32 (2011).
273. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 15 U.S.C. H§ 7901-7903
(2012).
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Control from even collecting data about gun violence.274 Significantly, nearly
all of these special interest initiatives show up as opposition to regulation.
Not all of the special interest failures to regulate proceed through
inaction, however. Sometimes they are affirmatively passed as exemptions to
regulation. For example, free riders constitute a powerful set of interest
groups, obtaining such things as right-to-work laws, which permit their
beneficiaries to obtain the benefits of unionization without having to pay the
dues.275 The result is that wages are lower in right-to-work states than in others,
exacerbating the problem that labor is not sharing the returns from increases
in productivity. 276
Historically, public choice literature has focused on enacted legislation,
particularly during the New Deal. One thing that our regulatory history
reveals, however, is that almost every economic decision, to regulate or not to
regulate, exposes a conflict between interest groups. A priori, there is no
reason for thinking that decisions to regulate are more prone to capture than
decisions not to regulate. Further, as noted before, the Constitutional
structure places a thumb on the scales by making it easier to resist legislation
than to pass it.2 77
V. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
While the progressive state has its share of imperfections, it also has much
to offer, including a superior record of economic performance and, when it
is working well, a sincere concern that both political participation and the
gains from economic growth be widely distributed. The progressive state has
proven to be reasonably adept at using economics and social science in service
of the public interest. Many of these activities are sector specific and involve
collection and interpretation of data that Congress could never do itself. This
makes agencies essential.
The progressive state's biggest challenge, as would be true of any
government dominated by legislative and agency decision-making, is the need
to limit special interest capture. Here, the historical record of progressive
intervention is not pretty. Progressive legislative and agency policymaking
reflects many instances of special interest control or crony capitalism. This is
hardly an argument for abolishing the progressive state.78 Indeed,
274. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 218, 125 Stat. 1065, 1o85 (2012); Arthur L.
Kellermann & Frederick P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun Research, 3o 9 JAMA 549, 549
(2013).
275. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 8o-o1, 6o Stat.
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2012)).
276. ELISE GOULD & WILL KIMBALL, ECON. POLICY INST., "RIGHT-TO-WORK' STATES STILL
HAVE LOWER WAGES 3-6 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/82934 .pdf.
277. See supra Part W.A.
278. See supra Part IV.D.
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notwithstanding its greater propensity to capture, the progressive state has
outperformed alternatives.
Rather, history suggests that the boundary between markets and
regulation, and between healthy and misguided regulation, is a set of
empirically driven and moving targets. The continued success of the
progressive state's ability to maintain or improve its record of economic
performance depends on its ability to keep special interest legislation and
crony capitalism at bay. Further, it must combat special interest movements
in opposition to socially desirable legislation. Several things might help.
As a guiding principle, policymakers at all levels should make consumer
welfare the focus of regulatory design. Far too often regulators have listened
carefully to producers, who are large and well organized, rather than
disorganized and individually small consumers. Given consumer disunity and
difference, this will require institutions to develop more objective, or external,
criteria for assessing consumer welfare. Examples of regulatory initiatives
lacking a significant consumer perspective are legion, but they include things
like federal intellectual property law, state statutes limiting public broadband
expansion at the behest of private interests,279 and state or local laws limiting
competition by various classes of common carriers. Identifying consumer
welfare implications of proposed legislation is largely a tool for cost-benefit
analysis.
Next, for enacted legislation and rules, the courts should adopt as a rule
of statutory construction that when capture is suspected, a statute or
administrative rule that is sufficiently ambiguous should be interpreted
against the interests of those behind its drafting. Such a rule of construction
forces special interests to return to their legislative benefactors, perhaps
repeatedly, and in the process make their actions more transparent.2
8 o This
rule of interpretation is particularly important when cost-benefit analysis has
not been done, as is often true of direct legislation.21 The Constitution
cannot reasonably be read to impose cost-benefit analysis on Congress or state
legislatures directly,282 but the proposed rule of statutory construction could
279. See Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3 d 597, 614 (6th Cir.) (striking down an FCC rule that
would prevent states from limiting municipal broadband expansion).
28o. See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: How TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION (2oo8); Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
567 (2006) (proposing such an approach to the pervasive producer capture reflected in the 1976
Copyright Act).
281. On cost-benefit analysis, see generally RICHARD L. REvEsz & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND OUR HEALTH (2008); CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); andJohn D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law
and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008). For a pessimistic conclusion regarding cost-benefit
analysis of financial regulation and legislation, see generally John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit
Analysis ofFinancial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
282. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
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help. Survival of cost-benefit analysis is certainly not a guarantee that capture
is absent, but it does promote transparency and forces constituents to
consider which interests are worth calculating, capable of being calculated,
and how they trade against each other.
Third, the Constitutional and other legal tools we already have for
disciplining capture could be made more effective. Equal Protection (and to
a lesser extent Due Process) review of economic legislation should have
greater bite. 283 While "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny" are well established
parts of Equal Protection analysis in the courts, those phrases are not a part
of the Constitutional text.284 Capture should be an evidentiary question to be
examined, not presumed one way or the other. Today, variations in the level
of Equal Protection analysis depend mainly on the classification that a state
decision makes. Race discrimination gets the highest scrutiny, economic
regulation the lowest, gender and legitimacy intermediate scrutiny, and the
like. Just as important as the classification, however, is the rationale for the
distinction that the challenged legislation or other legal rule imposes.
In its current form, rational basis Equal Protection analysis is practically
impotent against nearly all forms of special interest capture involving
economic legislation. Surveying the Supreme Court landscape in Sensational
Smiles-a case upholding the power of Connecticut dentists to exclude
nondentists from whitening teeth-Judge Calabresi recently concluded that
"[t]he simple truth is that the Supreme Court has long permitted state
economic favoritism of all sorts," including statutes that used licensing to
shield professionals from competition.28 5 Ultimately, he concluded, a great
deal of state activity operates "to favor certain groups over others on economic
grounds. We call this politics."286 But that cannot be an acceptable answer.
Politics knows no limits; that is one of the reasons we have a Constitution.
405 (1989).
283. One recent example of very weak Equal Protection analysis is Sensational Smiles, LLC
v. Mullen, 793 F-3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1 16o (2016) (upholding, under
rational basis test, an Equal Protection challenge to a statute that excluded nondentists from the
provision of teeth whitening services). Contrast St.Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F-3 d 215 (5th
Cir. 2013) (statute that forbade all but licensed funeral directors from selling caskets violated
Equal Protection clause); and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3 d 220 (6th Cir. 2oo2) (similar).
284. See Suzanna Sherry, Selective judicial activism: Defending Carolene Products (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-9, 2016),
http://papersssm.com/sl3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2741 287 (observing that "rational basis"
really refers to differential levels of scrutiny, but defending traditional progressive view that
market activities should be subjected to less intrusive review than state actions affecting
fundamental noneconomic rights).
285. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286 (citing Fitzgerald v. RacingAss'n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S.
103 (2003)) (favoring riverboat gambling over racetrack gambling). See generally City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (banning street vendors); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (discriminating against opticians who operated out of retail stores).
286. Id. at 287.
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As devices for addressing capture, the Supreme Court's 1905 Lochner
decision and its 1938 Carolene Products decision reflect opposing mistakes. 87
Lochner struck down economic legislation after presuming capture, but
without insisting on proof or even acknowledging the capturing interests in a
particular situation.288 Carolene Products went to the opposite extreme,
approving a statute that was an obvious product of anti-consumer capture by
the dairy industry without significant review.2ss Instances of capture that are
factually proven to be more severe should invite a more probing analysis.29o
The arguments made here are to some extent at odds with the progressive
legacy of constitutional interpretation, which has been unnecessarily
deferential to economic legislation.
Closer and more substantive scrutiny should apply in other areas as well.
One example is exercises of the eminent domain power where the public use
requirement seems dubious. The constitutional language of the Takings
Clause is open ended and a more restrictive interpretation would be
consistent with the text. Overly broad use of eminent domain for the benefit
of private parties, including direct transfer to developers, is particularly prone
287. See supra, text accompanying notes 197, 232-40.
288. Seegenerally Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
289. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
290. Because the challenged statute was federal, Carolene Products was a challenge under the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. See id. at 151. However, the Court not only declined to
find a violation of Due Process, but also concluded that factual analysis of the statute's basis was
unnecessary:
We may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislature can
forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by
applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that a statute would deny
due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which
would show or tend -to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty, or
property had a rational basis.
But such we think is not the purpose or construction of the statutory characterization
of filled milk as injurious to health and as a fraud upon the public. There is no need
to consider it here as more than a declaration of the legislative findings deemed to
support and justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion of the legislative
power, aiding informed judicial review, as do the reports of legislative committees,
by revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the absence of such aids the
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Id. at 152.
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to crony capitalism.29 One likely example is the facts underlying the Supreme
Court's Kelo decision, which has provoked an enormous critical literature.292
Some of these approaches can operate as significant limitations on state
sovereignty, unless the states decide to go along. In Sensational Smiles, Judge
Calabresi also observed that interpreting the Equal Protection clause more
broadly so as to reach instances of capture that did not violate any specific
provision of the Constitution would be "destructive to federalism and to the
power of the sovereign states to regulate their internal economic affairs."293
This problem is a real one and exposes a conundrum for both conservatives
and libertarians. On the one hand, concerns about federalism operate so as
to give the states significant control over their domestic economies even if
their control reflects significant special interest capture. For example,Justice
Alito dissented from the North Carolina State Board ofDental Examiners decision
disapproving that association's exclusion of non-dentist teeth whiteners. He
accused the majority of faulting a state process because it was "not structured
in a way that merits a good-government seal of approval."294 At the same time,
however, capture at any governmental level threatens the legitimacy of
democratic, representative government.
All of this leads to a fourth tool, although one of limited utility. Antitrust
law can combat economic capture in some cases. Its "state action" exemption
attempts to navigate the line between control of anticompetitive instances of
capture and protection of state prerogatives. Under it, a state is largely free to
regulate internally as it will, even to the point of permitting large-scale special
interest capture. However, it must articulate its wish to do so clearly, and any
private discretionary conduct must be adequately supervised by a
disinterested public official. Acting under that doctrine, the Supreme Court
struck down a North Carolina rule somewhat similar to the Connecticut rule
that the Second Circuit upheld.295
The analogy between the North Carolina and Connecticut provisions is
not perfect, however. The North Carolina rule prohibiting anyone except
dentists from whitening teeth came from a professional association
291. See generally Calabresi & Liebowitz, supra note 195; Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the
Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public Benefit in an Era ofAgglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023
(2011).
292. See generally, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a good, if
somewhat restrictive, critique, see generally SOMIN, supra note 215. On the legislative response to
Kelo, see generally Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten YearsAfterKelo, 125 YALEL.J.F. 82 (2015).
293. Sensational Smiles, 793 F-3d at 287.
294. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. CL 1101, 1117 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
295. Id See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism and the North
Carolina Dental Case, CPI ANTrrRUST CHRON., Apr. 2015, 1, https://www.competitionpolicy
international.com/assets/Uploads/HovenkampApr-152.pdf; see also generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Progressive Antitrust (Jan. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/so13/
papers.cfm?abstractid=28g2336.
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dominated by practicing dentists and with no government review. By contrast,
the teeth whitening rule in the Connecticut case was issued under a statute
requiring approval by the Commissioner of Public Health, a public official.296
Whether the Connecticut Commissioner of Public Health "actively
supervised" the. dentists' decision in the antitrust sense is unclear. Agencies
that simply rubber stamp private regulatory requests do not satisfy the
requirement. For example, in Ticor Title Insurance Company, the Supreme
Court required "[a] ctual state involvement, not deference to private price-
fixing."297 It then concluded that an agency that simply approved joint
regulatory requests without review failed to meet the requirement.29s Judge
Calabresi declined to pass judgment on how the Connecticut eeth-whitening
rule would fare under an antitrust challenge, which was not before it.299 That
would require fact finding into the authority of the Commissioner, including
whether it had and actually exercised power to review and disapprove
proposed rules after considering their competitive effects. Even here the state
could articulate as anticompetitive a goal as it pleased, provided that a state
official carried it out faithfully. Or to say this somewhat differently, the
antitrust state action doctrine does not eliminate capture, but it may force
state actors to make their intentions more transparent.
Fundamentally, the progressive vision of statecraft is sound. Its position
on the robustness of markets is less categorical than alternatives, but more
realistic. That position calls for significant regulatory intervention, but
regulation itself must be metered so as to account for changes in theory,
demographics, or historical experience. The progressive state's biggest
challenge remains how to accomplish this while not succumbing to special
interest capture. Managing that will require it to yield some of the territory
that it has claimed since the 1930s.
296. See Sensational Smiles, 793 F-3 d at 283.
297. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. CO., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
298. Id. at 638.
299. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3 d at 288. But seeTeladoc, Inc. v. Texas Med. Bd., No. 1-15-CV-
343, 2015 WL 8773509, at *io (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2015) (holding that simple state-agency
review of a private decision was insufficient supervision), appeal filed, No. 16-50017, 2015 WL
8773509 (5 th Cir.Jan. 12, 2016).
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